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From the 1950 to 1967, the U.S. government, employing the newly formed 
CIA, covertly provided the majority of the funding for an international organization 
comprised primarily of Western non-communist left intellectuals known as the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom. The Paris-based Congress saw its primary mission as 
facilitating cooperative networks of non-communist left intellectuals in order to sway 
the intelligentsia of Western Europe away from its lingering fascination with 
communism. This thesis explores how the Congress largely succeeded in the 1950s in 
establishing a cohesive international network of intellectuals by fostering a 
transatlantic consensus around “vital center” liberalism as a necessary guardian of the 
Western cultural intellectual tradition in the face of perceived communist threats. By 
examining the ways in which developments in the 1960s shattered this transatlantic 
consensus this thesis demonstrates how the Congress suffered an inevitable demise as 
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During the tense early years of the Cold War, the United States government, 
employing the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency, covertly provided the 
majority of the funding for an international organization comprised primarily of non-
communist left (NCL) intellectuals known as the Congress for Cultural Freedom 
(CCF). The Paris-based CCF saw its primary mission as facilitating cooperative 
networks of NCL intellectuals and sought to draw upon the cultural influence of these 
individuals to sway the intelligentsia of Western Europe away from its lingering 
fascination with communism and its sympathetic views of the Soviet Union. The CCF 
stressed that communism presented an urgent and dangerous threat to the tradition of 
cultural-intellectual freedom venerated by Western intellectuals. In the words of 
Michael Josselson, Executive Secretary and CIA liaison for the organization, the CCF 
“could seize the initiative from the Communists by reaffirming the fundamental 
ideals governing cultural (and political) action in the Western world and the 
repudiation of all totalitarian challenges.”1 Despite the challenges in bringing together 
an often-quarrelsome collection of intellectuals, the Congress found success amid the 
tense struggle of the early Cold War in building a coalition united in opposing the 
popular belief among European intellectuals that communism was more 
accommodating to culture than liberal or “bourgeois” democracy.2 
                                                
     1 Michael Josselson quoted in Michael Warner, “Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom 
1949-1950,” Studies in Intelligence 38, no.5 (2007): 93. As a historian with the CIA’s History Staff, 
Warner utilized classified documents unavailable to other scholars in the writing of this article. While 
these documents allow Warner to provide highly valuable insights into the CCF, his work is that of an 
in-house historian, containing deliberate omissions and aiming to defend the role of the CIA, and 
should be read as such.  
     2 Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters 
(New York: The New Press, 1999), 1. 
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At the height of its operations in the 1950s, the CCF established national 
committees in thirty-five countries, organized international conferences and seminars, 
published a family of magazines consisting of over twenty journals, and provided 
patronage and venues for artists, writers, and musicians. This scale of operations was 
made possible by the deep pockets of the CIA and its decision to embrace the NCL as 
a reliable anti-communist force that would come to be the theoretical foundation of 
the Agency’s political operations against communism over the next fifteen years.3 
International Operations Divisions (IOD) Deputy Director, Cord Meyer, stressed the 
importance of the NCL in Europe when he argued that the primary competition for 
“votes and influence was focused on the left side of the political spectrum, where the 
struggle for the allegiance of the European working class and liberal intelligentsia 
would be decided.”4 Representing the CIA’s view of the NCL as a reliable anti-
communist force, IOD Director, Thomas Braden later remarked, “in much of Europe 
in the 1950s, socialists, people who called themselves ‘left’-the very people whom 
many Americans thought no better than Communists–were the only people who gave 
a damn about fighting Communism.”5  
The extensive range of operations conducted by the Congress and supported 
by the CIA was intended to gain the backing of the European NCL with the aim of 
establishing a cohesive network of influential intellectuals united in opposition to 
communism. In its facilitation of a European NCL intellectual network, the Congress 
stressed the shared cultural-intellectual tradition of Western Europe and the US in its 
                                                
     3 Saunders, 63. 
     4 Cord Meyer, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (New York: Harper & Row, 
1980), 57. 
     5 Thomas Braden, “I’m Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral,’” Saturday Evening Post, May 20 1967, 10. 
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effort to foster a transatlantic intellectual consensus between European and American 
intellectuals. Viewing Soviet-directed international Communism as a significant 
threat to the freedoms upon which this tradition was based, the Congress urged 
intellectuals to take a stand and vigorously defend cultural freedom. Clearly 
demarcating the borders of acceptability, the Congress defined the debate over 
communism as a struggle over cultural freedom and argued that those who opposed 
the defense of cultural freedom or remained neutral on the cause must be presented as 
beyond the pale of the Western cultural-intellectual tradition.6  
While CIA funding allowed the Congress to operate on a scale that would 
have otherwise been impossible, Agency backing alone does not explain the 
significant role in the Western intellectual landscape that the organization enjoyed in 
the early postwar years. The Congress succeeded in attracting distinguished Western 
intellectuals with reputations to lose by establishing itself as a serious and seemingly 
independent cultural-intellectual organization that responded to the needs of the 
Western intelligentsia in the 1950s. The Congress became a vigorous, influential, and 
cohesive organization in its first decade of existence by establishing a transatlantic 
intellectual consensus around the notion that the “vital center” of American liberalism 
espoused by Arthur Schlesinger and other postwar liberals not only satisfied postwar 
European needs for social stability by mitigating the appeal of political extremes but 
also represented the foundation for the continued prosperity of the Western cultural-
intellectual tradition. When the 1950s gave way to the 1960s, the emergence of the 
New Left, radicalization of the Civil Rights Movement, and escalation of the Vietnam 
                                                
     6 Giles Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the 
CIA and Post-War American Hegemony, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 99. 
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War discredited “vital center” liberalism in the eyes of many Western intellectuals 
and shattered the CCF’s transatlantic intellectual consensus around this political 
philosophy as a necessary guardian of the Western cultural-intellectual tradition. With 
its transatlantic intellectual consensus around “vital center” liberalism providing more 
contention than cohesion, the Congress suffered a demise in the 1960s that would 
have occurred irrespective of revelations of CIA funding in 1966 and 1967. 
This thesis examines the demise of the Congress in order to illuminate aspects 
of the organization’s transatlantic intellectual consensus and role in the Cultural Cold 
War that have been overlooked by the existing scholarship. By seriously examining 
the CCF and its motivations within a theoretical framework, this thesis aims to avoid 
the tendency towards pejorative or apologetic assessments that have plagued a great 
deal of work on the Congress. Beginning the propensity of historians to portray the 
Congress as either a reprehensible instrument of the CIA or a virtuous and 
autonomous organization, Christopher Lasch produced the first scholarly assessment 
of the organization with a scathing treatment in his 1968 work, Agony of the 
American Left.7 The Congress received little further attention until Peter Coleman 
wrote the first monograph devoted to the organization with his 1989 effort, The 
Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the 
Mind of Postwar Europe.8 Coleman, who served for a number of years as editor of 
the CCF’s Australian journal, Quadrant, responded to Lasch’s earlier attacks with a 
largely apologetic account of the Congress that stressed the vital importance of its 
mission. Far greater scholarly attention has been given to the Congress in the wake of 
                                                
     7 Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the American Left (New York: Knopf, 1968). 
     8 Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for 
the Mind of Postwar Europe (New York: The Free Press, 1989). 
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Frances Stonor Saunders’ commercially successful and colorful 1999 work, The 
Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters.9 Published in the UK 
with the more provocative title, Who Paid the Piper?: The CIA and the Cultural Cold 
War, Saunders’ use of exclusive interviews and other previously unavailable sources 
shed new light on various personalities and relationships in the organization but 
offered little to further our understanding of the ideas at work in the Congress or the 
nature of its role in the Cold War.10  
By examining the Congress with an assessment grounded in Gramscian 
theory, Giles Scott-Smith produced the first serious attempt to locate the organization 
within a theoretical framework with his 2002 work, The Politics of Apolitical 
Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and Post-War American 
Hegemony.11 Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony provided Scott-Smith with the 
conceptual means to escape the protracted arguments concerning dependence and 
autonomy that have often characterized scholarship on the Congress and the broader 
Cultural Cold War. Scott-Smith’s analysis accentuated the common interest of 
Congress members and the CIA in fostering a broad transatlantic consensus that 
stressed both the Western cultural-intellectual tradition shared by intellectuals on both 
sides of the Atlantic and the urgency with which this tradition needed to be defended 
from communist threats.12 By emphasizing this congruence of interests between the 
Western intellectuals who comprised the Congress and the CIA, he presented the 
                                                
     9 Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters 
(New York: The New Press, 1999). 
     10 Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?: The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: 
Granta Books, 1999). 
     11 Giles Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the 
CIA and Post-War American Hegemony, (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
     12 Ibid., 99. 
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CCF’s relationship with the CIA and its general support for American foreign policy 
as part of a hegemonic coalition of Atlanticists allied against the Soviet Union.13 This 
thesis provides a more comprehensive understanding of the Atlanticist consensus 
fostered by the Congress by stressing the importance of “vital center” liberalism to 
the successful establishment of this consensus in the 1950s. By diving deeply into the 
deterioration of the Congress and examining the ways in which the disintegration of 
consensus around “vital center’ liberalism in the 1960s led to its demise, we gain a 
greater understanding of how the Congress functioned during its successful years in 
the 1950s and the fundamental contributions of a viable “vital center” to that success. 
Told as part of the larger story of transatlantic relations amid the decline of postwar 
American liberalism, the fracturing of consensus around “vital center” liberalism 
within the Congress provides a unique prospective from which to approach a well-
trodden facet of postwar political and intellectual history.  
In many ways, the political and intellectual currents of the early postwar years 
grew out of reflections upon the Holocaust, the Great Terror, and other unthinkable 
extremes and horrors experienced in the first half of the twentieth century. When they 
reflected on these events in the wake of World War II, many Western intellectuals 
came to a profound disillusionment with politics of the far right and far left. As these 
intellectuals eschewed the political extremes of their past, many came to embrace a 
form of liberalism that would find its most salient articulation in Arthur Schlesinger 
Jr.’s seminal 1949 work, The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom.14 In particular, 
European intellectuals of the NCL came to a stronger embrace of the liberal “vital 
                                                
     13 Ibid., 4. 
     14 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (Cambridge, MA: The 
Riverside Press, 1949). 
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center” and its value as a guardian of the Western cultural-intellectual tradition as 
they watched the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia and worried about 
the power and influence wielded by the Communist Party in Italy, France, and other 
Western European countries. Though broadly concerned with the expansion of Soviet 
geopolitical influence in Europe in the early postwar years, European NCL 
intellectuals, and their American counterparts, expressed particular concern towards 
the allure that communism held for many in the European intelligentsia. Perceiving 
themselves as an underrepresented minority in a European intellectual community 
often represented by prominent communist or fellow- traveling figures such as Jean-
Paul Sartre and Pablo Picasso, the individuals who comprised the early Congress 
viewed their mission to organize European NCL intellectuals into a cohesive network 
as a matter of grave and urgent importance.15  
As leading American and European NCL intellectuals who would go on to 
form the CCF, such as Benedetto Croce, John Dewey, Sidney Hook, Arthur Koestler, 
Bertrand Russell, and Ignazio Silone, expressed increasing anxiety over the direction 
of the European intellectual climate in the early postwar years, a convergence 
developed between the views of these intellectuals and the agenda put forward by the 
“combination of Ivy League, anglophile, liberal, can-do gentlemen, academics, and 
idealists who constituted the new CIA.”16 While there remains a tremendous amount 
of uncertainty and controversy concerning the degree to which the CIA exerted 
influence over the CCF, it is clear that the Congress did not originate simply as an 
                                                
     15 Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle 
for the Mind of Postwar Europe (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 7. 
     16 Ibid., 46. 
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Agency creation.17 Rather, the organizational apparatus of the Congress grew out of 
efforts by Hook and individuals largely associated with the avant-garde, left-leaning, 
anti-Stalinist intellectual circle centered around Columbia University, New York 
University and The City College of New York known as the New York 
Intellectuals.18 While the New York Intellectuals provided the initial organizational 
foundation of the organization, the Congress should not be seen as the creation of 
Hook and his associates but rather as an international organization that succeeded 
because it represented a manifestation of concerns and interests held by intellectuals 
on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Such concerns came to bear when the Communist Information Bureau 
(Cominform) staged its most daring provocation of the Cold War with the 1949 
Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in 
New York City. Reflecting concerns resonating in the broader Western intelligentsia 
over increased Soviet efforts to attract the support of Western intellectuals, Hook and 
others associated with the New York Intellectuals organized a counter-offensive to 
the Comiform Conference. Renting the honeymoon suite on the hotel’s tenth floor to 
serve as their headquarters, Hook and the Americans for Intellectual Freedom 
deliberately asked difficult and awkward questions of the Soviet delegates and 
                                                
     17 The question of the degree to which the CIA exerted influence on the Congress is a particularly 
contentious issue. As CIA records on the Congress remain largely unavailable, scholars have had to 
rely primarily on records from the CCF and consequently have produced a wide range of 
interpretations concerning the CIA-CCF relationship. For an interpretation of the CIA-CCF 
relationship that stresses the Congress as an instrument of the CIA see Frances Stonor Saunders, The 
Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. For a contrasting interpretation, 
stressing the relative autonomy of the Congress, see Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the 
CIA Played America. For an interpretation of the Congress as a hegemonic institution in the European 
intellectual landscape that both reflected the genuine concerns of Western intellectuals and served the 
interests of the CIA see Giles Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for 
Cultural Freedom, the CIA and Post-War American Hegemony.  
     18 Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), 73. 
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organized a well-attended counter-rally at nearby Bryant Park.19 Following this 
successful effort to thwart Soviet initiatives aimed at monopolizing the “Peace 
Movement”, Hook traveled to Europe to take part in the organization of a similar 
counter-rally against the Cominform sponsored Paris World Peace Conference. While 
in Paris, he met with Melvin Lasky, a young associate of the New York Intellectuals 
who worked for the American military government in Germany as editor for the U.S. 
sponsored cultural-intellectual review Der Monat.20  
Hoping to build on the momentum generated by earlier sporadic counter-
rallies, Hook and Lasky discussed the possibility of creating a permanent and 
cohesive network of anti-communist intellectuals to serve as democratic opposition to 
Cominform efforts.21 Pressing forward with their plans, Hook consulted Ruth Fischer, 
a former Communist International (Comintern) officer and prominent German anti-
Stalinist , who was already planning a large-scale anti-communist demonstration in 
Berlin to give “the Politburo hell right at the gate of their own hell.”22 Fischer and 
Hook’s plan to organize an anti-communist demonstration in defense of intellectual 
and cultural freedom was well received by Josselson, who was then stationed in 
Berlin as a CIA officer and had previously attended the Americans for Intellectual 
Freedom counter-rally in New York. Hoping to forge a more permanent apparatus by 
building upon the energy and success he had witnessed in New York, Josselson 
forwarded the plan for a Berlin demonstration to his supervisor, Office of Policy 
                                                
     19 Ibid., 70-71.  
     20 Ibid., 78. 
     21 Ibid. 
     22 Ruth Fischer quoted in Warner, 92.  
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Coordination Director, Frank Wisner. The CIA approved the project in April 1950 
with plans for the CCF’s inaugural conference to take place in June.23  
Though not a creation of the CIA, the CCF’s continued financial existence 
and ability to project its message on a large scale were nonetheless only made 
possible by Agency funding. By placing the Congress alongside other cases of covert 
CIA funding of ostensibly independent domestic and international organizations, such 
as the AFL-CIO, the American Society of African Culture and the National Student 
Association, the CIA-CCF relationship can be seen as the primary cultural-
intellectual facet of an extensive system of state-private networks utilized by the CIA 
to amplify existing voices sympathetic to its position in order to influence foreign 
individuals and societies. As with other examples of state-private network 
intervention in the Cold War, the impetus for the Congress emanated not from the 
State by means of the CIA but rather through the efforts of private European and 
American citizens.24 The CCF, along with the other organizations that comprised the 
CIA’s system of state-private networks, held membership significantly composed of 
private American citizens who had preexisting links to similar groups overseas. Such 
links were often based on a shared identity: racial in the case of the American Society 
of African Culture, generational in the case of the National Student Association, that 
of being an intellectual in the case of the CCF, and so on. These preexisting links and 
organizations supplied the foundation for state-private networks and provided the 
                                                
    23 Wilford, 78-79. 
    24 W. Scott Lucas, “Beyond Freedom, Beyond Control: Approaches to Culture and the State-Private 
Network in the Cold War,” in The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960, eds. Giles Scott-
Smith and Hans Krabbendam (Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 60.  
 11 
 
CIA with the means to influence strategically important segments of foreign 
populations.25  
Though origins in the initiatives of private US and European citizens provided 
a sense of authenticity and independence that would not have been possible had the 
Congress been a State creation, the CCF ultimately succeeded in exerting influence 
and establishing consensus in the 1950s primarily because it responded to the existing 
concerns and needs of Western intellectuals. For Western, particularly European, 
intellectuals who feared the potential threats of communist influence on traditional 
Western cultural-intellectual values, the urgency of the early years of the Cold War 
and the ascendency of a “vital center” of American liberalism both served to 
underscore the importance of the US as a necessary guardian of the Western tradition 
and as a more palatable political, intellectual and cultural leader. While the US 
government had, for some time, possessed the political, economic, and military clout 
to assume a leadership role in the Western world, European intellectuals had 
generally found little attractive, or worthy of emulation, in the realms of American 
culture or politics.26 Though the efforts of the Congress focused extensively on 
improving European perceptions of American cultural productions and political 
philosophies of the US, the organization did not have to build a consensus from the 
ground up. Rather, the Congress found itself able to solidify and expand the notion 
that had become increasingly prevalent among European intellectuals in the early 
postwar period in the value of a “vital center” of political consensus as a necessary 
                                                
     25 Wilford, 8. 
     26 Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American 
Culture Since World War II  (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 156-157. 
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bulwark of freedom against threatening communist expansion.27 The support of such 
European intellectuals for a liberal “vital center” as a necessary guardian of the 
Western cultural-intellectual tradition emanated from a genuine belief in this political 
philosophy as providing the means to achieve social stability for postwar Europe. For 
the European members of the Congress and their American counterparts, “vital 
center” liberalism provided a broad political umbrella from which to address major 
socio-economic issues and an effective means to thwart the threatening expansion of 
communist influence.  
While the anti-communist convictions of the European NCL and their 
recognition of the shared cultural-intellectual tradition of Europe and the US 
significantly aided Congress efforts to forge a transatlantic intellectual consensus, the 
legacy of the New Deal and the ascendency of the postwar liberal order in the US 
allowed the Congress to attract those European intellectuals who were put off by the 
militant anti-communism and reactionary politics that had long been representative of 
the US. Soon after the organization’s formation, Josselson and other leading members 
of the Congress realized that a single-minded focus on anti-communism and an 
explicitly pro-American position would prove counterproductive in reaching out to 
many left-of-center European intellectuals, particularly in France and Italy.28 
Relegating Arthur Koestler and other hardline anti-communists with conservative 
political tendencies to the margins of the organization, the Congress endorsed the 
aggressively internationalist and anti-communist, but still fundamentally liberal, 
                                                
     27 Scott-Smith, 81. 
     28 Coleman, 35. 
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politics outlined by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and later developed by leading members 
such as Daniel Bell.29  
Along with a growing canon of work by postwar liberals, Schlesinger’s The 
Vital Center came to be a fundamental element in the intellectual foundation of the 
Congress. Schlesinger’s insistence on the international applicability of postwar 
American style liberalism and the need to promote social progress in order to 
establish space for a liberal “vital center” of political consensus to avoid the excesses 
of extreme positions on both the right and the left found a receptive audience among 
leading members of the Congress.30 Involved with the Congress from its formation, 
Schlesinger belonged to the contingent of American intellectuals in the organization 
who sought to overcome European reservations and neutrality towards the 
increasingly hostile relationship developing between the US and the Soviet Union.31 
Embracing Schlesinger’s “vital center,” the Congress further developed its political 
and intellectual platform around the “end of ideology” thesis championed by 
Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, and Seymour Lipset. Led by Daniel Bell, proponents of 
the “end of ideology” maintained that the ideologies of strict capitalism or socialism 
no longer had a place in the political and economic context of the 1950s and that 
essentially all socio-economic issues could be addressed by a technocratic application 
of somewhat greater or lesser government intervention into the economy.32 With the 
death of Stalin and the relative decline of urgency in Europe amid an emerging 
détente, the focus of the Congress shifted from the more aggressive anti-communism 
                                                
     29 Coleman, 33-34. 
     30 Scott-Smith, 107, 108. 
     31 Scott-Smith, 54. 
     32 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York: 
The Free Press, 1962), 402 
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of its early years to an emphasis on “the end of ideology” and its presumption that the 
debate over communism had already concluded in favor of technocracy and the 
welfare liberalism of the “vital center.”33  
Even amid the often-militant anti-communist rhetoric of the CCF’s early 
existence, leading figures of the Congress expressed a nascent sense that the 
organization would need to stand for more than simply anti-communism to succeed as 
a coherent and ongoing organization. Among those members of the Congress who 
hoped to emphasize the positive aspects of “vital center” liberalism rather than a 
negative focus on anti-communism, Ignazio Silone, in his opening speech at the 1950 
Berlin Conference, stressed rather than militant anti-communism the need for the 
West to promote social and political reform to mitigate the moral appeal that 
communism’s emphasis on social justice often held for intellectuals. Silone 
recognized and emphasized the tendency of militant anti-communism to lead to 
totalitarian methods in its opposition of totalitarian communism. Rallying against 
single-minded anti-communists who sought to use methods he viewed as essentially 
totalitarian, he eloquently proclaimed, “A democracy which, in order to be 
                                                
     33 While the technocratic approach to governance began to gain significant support among the 
political establishment in the postwar era, the intellectual roots of technocracy precede its acceptance 
among political circles. Providing an early influence on technocratic concepts that would later be 
picked up by postwar thinkers, Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion, published in 1922, critically 
assessed democratic government and the self-serving irrational social perceptions that influence 
individual behavior. In stressing the limited ability of the public to define its own interests, Lippmann 
advanced the “manufacture of consent” as a necessary means to identify the “common interests” of the 
public that are often not evident. In order to illuminate such “common interests” Lippmann proposed 
that a professional “specialized class” present their conclusions to the political establishment, which 
would employ the “art of persuasion” to inform the public about the decisions and circumstances 
affecting them. Lippmann further stressed the value of a professional “specialized class,” or 
technocrats, in his 1925 work, Phantom Public. In his representation of “the public” as an abstract 
illusion, Lippmann divided society between “insiders” who make decisions and the “outsiders” of 
society who largely act as bystanders. By throwing his support behind the “insiders” Lippmann, who 
later wrote the CCF’s German journal Der Monat, emerged as an early supporter of technocracy that 
would later find significant support from postwar intellectuals such as Daniel Bell, Richard Hofstadter, 
and Arthur Schlesinger Jr.  
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efficacious, imitates totalitarian actions and reveals a uniform, behaves, in fact, like a 
man who, through fear of death, commits suicide.”34 By embracing Silone’s emphasis 
on liberal reform and refusal to abandon liberal principles over Koestler’s firebrand 
anti-communism, the Congress demonstrated an understanding that in order to bring 
together a disparate group of Western intellectuals it would not simply be able to 
depend solely on opposing something but would have to in fact stand for something.   
With a belief in the “vital center” of American liberalism as the foundation for 
the continued prosperity of the cultural-intellectual tradition shared by Europe and the 
US, the Congress found something to stand for and a point around which to rally an 
often-disparate collection of Western NCL intellectuals. Assessing the 1950 
conference in Berlin, the American novelist, James Farrell, stressed the positive 
influence the ascendency of American liberalism had on the forging of a transatlantic 
consensus with the contention that “all of the speeches at Berlin, the very Congress 
itself, were made possible…by the social gains, the social advances made by the 
American labor unions and the positive legacy of Roosevelt.”35 Just as the Marshall 
Plan sought to internationalize the American liberalism of the New Deal, the 
Congress emerged out of an effort to internationalize the efforts American NCL 
intellectuals. Still, the Congress should not be seen merely as an instrument of the US 
government. On its own, the financial support of the CIA would never have been able 
to forge or maintain consensus among a disparate collection of anti-communist 
intellectuals. The Congress found success in forming a transatlantic intellectual 
                                                
     34 Ignazio Silone, “Address by Mr. Ignazio Silone at the Inaugural Meeting of the Berlin Congress 
for Cultural Freedom”, June 25, 1950, Series III, Box 1, Folder 2, p3, “International Association for 
Cultural Freedom Collection”, Special Collections Research Center, Joseph Regenstein Library, 
University of Chicago, Chicago Illinois, (From here on noted as IACF). 
     35 James Farrell, “Congress Comments”, Series III, Box 1, Folder 1, IACF.  
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consensus in the 1950s by emphasizing a form of liberalism that responded to the 
existing intellectual needs and concerns of the Western intelligentsia. Responding to 
the threats presented by Soviet communism towards the Western cultural-intellectual 
tradition perceived by intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic, the Congress 
stressed that the mixed economy of “vital center” liberalism not only provided the 
means to solve all socio-economic problems through technocratic management but 
also represented a necessary guardian of Western cultural-intellectual values in a 
intellectual and geopolitical landscape in which those values were increasingly 
threatened. With the ascendency of a liberal “vital center” and the increasing currency 
of “the end of ideology” among Western intellectuals in the 1950s, the Congress 
succeeded in its first decade of existence in bringing together a significant cohort of 
European intellectuals, who both opposed Soviet communism and accepted a more 
prominent and influential role of the US in European political, cultural, and 
intellectual affairs.36  
The most successful years of the Congress came as it shifted from the currents 
of militant anti-communism expressed at the 1950 Berlin Conference to a more 
inclusive transatlantic intellectual consensus around liberalism of the “vital center.” 
This shift occurred as the Congress responded to a transformed Cold War that 
featured an emerging détente between the US and Soviet Union in place of the 
monolithic Stalinist threat of the early postwar years. However, by the mid-1960s a 
significant contingency of intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic had moved to the 
right or to the left of the liberal “vital center” in response to the emergence of the 
New Left, radicalization of the Civil Rights Movement, and escalation of the Vietnam 
                                                
     36 Scott-Smith, 102, 108, 154. 
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War. With the “vital center” of American liberalism discredited in the eyes of a 
significant number of Western intellectuals, the transatlantic intellectual consensus 
around this “vital center” as an attractive and necessary guardian of the Western 
cultural-intellectual tradition that the Congress had succeeded in forging during the 
1950s fell apart in the 1960s.  Existing independently from CIA influence, the CCF’s 
enduring support for a liberal  “vital center” represented a genuine belief among its 
members in the US and its political order as a necessary bulwark of freedom against 
the threats of Soviet communism. With the failure of “vital center” liberalism to 
address an array of urgent political and social issues in the 1960s, a significant 
element of the Western intelligentsia advanced radical challenges to the “vital center” 
from the left while an equally significant contingent drifted from liberal anti-
communism to neoconservatism and mounted challenges from the right.  
When consensus around the liberal “vital center” deteriorated within the 
Congress and the broader Western intelligentsia, a “middle ground” of agreement 
among a broad array of Western intellectuals no longer remained possible. The notion 
of a “middle ground” of cultural, intellectual, and political interaction developed by 
historian Richard White provides a constructive way of examining how the Congress 
employed “vital center” liberalism to foster consensus. White views the disparate 
parties who came to the “middle ground” as doing so out of a recognition that none of 
the sides involved in negotiation possessed the means to achieve their ends through 
force. Seeking their ends instead through persuasion, the parties concerned pursued 
both actual and perceived congruencies among their counterparts. Whether or not 
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such congruencies were rooted in reality does not matter.37 White contends that “any 
congruence, no matter how tenuous, can be put to work and can take on a life of its 
own if it is accepted by both sides. Cultural conventions do not have to be true to be 
effective any more than legal precedents do. They have only to be accepted.”38 In the 
urgent years of the early postwar period before New Left radicalism, black militancy, 
and the escalation of the Vietnam War, the intellectuals of the Congress could avoid 
highlighting inconvenient political divergences within the organization and gather 
under the broad political umbrella of “vital center” liberalism. When developments in 
the 1960s shattered consensus around “vital center” liberalism and simply labeling 
oneself a liberal ceased to be enough, the Congress lost the “middle ground” that had 
allowed it to bring together a diverse grouping of Western intellectuals.39  
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While the Congress neither needed nor sought to speak with a monolithic 
political voice, the “vital center” had provided the organization with the means for 
cohesion around a broad political consensus in opposition to communism and in 
support of a mixed economy and the welfare state. Whether attacked from the right or 
the left, the discrediting of American liberalism of the “vital center” fractured the 
consensus fostered by the Congress around this political philosophy as a necessary 
guardian of Western cultural-intellectual values. In examining how this transatlantic 
intellectual consensus fell apart in the latter half of the 1960s, this thesis illuminates 
the importance of “vital center” liberalism to the success enjoyed by the Congress in 
the 1950s. When the discrediting of “vital center” liberalism rendered consensus 
among its members untenable, the Congress ceased to be a functional cultural-
intellectual organization in its own right or a valuable ally for the CIA in the Cultural 
Cold War. By focusing the lens of examination on the crumbling of its transatlantic 
intellectual consensus around “vital center” liberalism, we gain a greater 
understanding of a demise the Congress would have suffered whether or not its CIA 

















A Changing Cold War and the Turn to “Vital Center” Liberalism 
 
As the 1950s gave way to the 1960s, the Congress faced a strikingly 
transformed Cold War from the often unpredictable and confrontational relations seen 
during the embryonic stages of the struggle between the US and Soviet Union in the 
years immediately following World War II. Stalin’s death in 1953, increasingly 
strained Sino-Soviet relations culminating in official Chinese acknowledgement of 
the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, and greater acceptance of co-existence and easing of 
tensions between the US and Soviet Union known as détente rewrote the rules of the 
Cold War game in which the CCF participated. While these and other developments 
in the Cold War affected US Soviet relations in a complex variety of ways they 
nonetheless served to normalize the Cold War struggle by reinforcing the status quo 
of superpower relations through encouraging greater diplomatic dialogue and 
effectively putting an end to the notion of the Cold War as a confrontation in which 
one side could or would “win.”40 
 The end of a monolithic Stalinist communist bloc and the nascent emergence 
of détente presented the CCF with remarkable opportunities as well as challenges. 
While a seemingly less aggressive and unified Communist Bloc and greater contact 
between East and West provided the Congress with tremendous opportunities to 
engage the other side of the Iron Curtain, it also held the potential to weaken the anti-
communist convictions of Western intellectuals which had significantly contributed 
to the transatlantic intellectual consensus forged by the organization during the 1950s. 
Though the new circumstances of the Cold War presented the Congress with an array 
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of serious challenges, the CCF’s transatlantic intellectual consensus around a liberal 
“vital center” as a necessary foundation for the continued prosperity of the Western 
cultural-intellectual tradition provided the means to adapt to these new developments 
in ways that would not have been possible had the organization continued to embrace 
the currents of reactionary and militant anti-communism expressed at the 1950 Berlin 
Conference. With a profoundly transformed Cold War pushing the Congress further 
towards a positive interpretation of “vital center” liberalism in its early years of 
existence, its members increasingly coalesced around the transatlantic intellectual 
consensus that contributed to its most influential and successful years in the 1950s.   
 The near universal support voiced for a positive interpretation of “vital center” 
liberalism by members of the Congress from the mid-1950s onwards represented a 
marked shift from the often reactionary and militant focus on anti-communism 
expressed at the organization’s inaugural conference in Berlin. When Arthur Koestler 
presented the “Manifesto of the Congress for Cultural Freedom” in the wake of North 
Korea’s invasion of South Korea to a cheering crowd of some 15,000 in the British 
sector of Berlin in 1950, his hard-line rhetoric fell upon receptive ears. Koetler 
proved a successful spokesperson for the “Freedom Manifesto” by drawing on the 
heightened sense of anti-communist urgency in the early postwar years. While his 
harsh rhetoric found a largely receptive audience in 1950, Koestler’s fellow 
contributors to the Manifesto recognized the long-term risks and limitations of over 
emphasizing and becoming overly dependent on anti-communism. Penned by 
Koestler and moderated in tone and substance by A.J. Ayer, Manés Sperber and Hugh 
Trevor-Roper, the “Freedom Manifesto” sought to avoid the perils of militant anti-
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communism and neutral endorsement of the status quo.41 Seeking to mitigate 
accusations of overly fervent anti-communism, the Manifesto’s authors couched its 
anti-communist emphasis in a purportedly objective rhetoric focused on the 
importance of defending cultural freedom from existing and expanding socio-political 
threats in order to attract as large of a swath of the political spectrum as possible.  
 In order to reach a broad political base of intellectuals the “Freedom 
Manifesto” carefully avoided striking too forceful an anti-communist stance and thus 
alienating Europe’s left-leaning intellectuals, particularly in France and Italy. In order 
to maintain the objectivity of their position and avoid alienation of left-of-center 
intellectuals, the writers of the thirteen article “Freedom Manifesto” dulled their Cold 
War swords by tactfully avoiding specific mention of communism. Nonetheless, the 
anti-communist direction of the document became evident in its numerous implicit 
statements of opposition to communism and the Soviet political system. Article six 
indirectly attacked communist ideology, declaring, “no political philosophy or 
economic theory can claim the sole right to represent freedom in the abstract. We 
hold that the value of such theories is to be judged by the range of concrete freedom 
which they accord the individual in practice.”42 The authors of the Manifesto directly 
opposed the role of the Communist Party as a vanguard or dictatorship of the 
proletariat with the declaration that “no race, nation, class or religion can claim the 
sole right to represent the idea of freedom, nor the right to deny freedom to other 
groups or creeds in the name of any ultimate ideal or lofty aim whatsoever.” 
Likewise, the authors challenged the historic role and appeal of the Soviet Union to 
                                                
     41 Coleman, 31-32. 
     42 For this and the immediately subsequent references to the “Freedom Manifesto” see “Freedom 
Manifesto,” Series III, Box 1, Folder 1, IACF. 
 23 
 
many intellectuals, proclaiming, “the historical contribution of any society is to be 
judged by the extent and quality of freedom which its members actually enjoy.” 
With the insistence that when in “times of emergency, restrictions on the 
freedom of the individual are imposed in the real or assumed interest of the 
community” such restrictions must be “confined to a minimum of clearly specified 
actions” the writers of the Manifesto made a significant overture towards a left-of-
center audience repulsed by the reactionary anti-communism of McCarthyism. 
Additionally, the Manifesto demanded that these restrictions must be “understood to 
be temporary and limited” and “that the measures restricting freedom be themselves 
subject to free criticism and democratic control.” Highlighting the similarity between 
McCarthyism and the arbitrary and aggressive nature of Soviet repression, the 
Manifesto writers proclaimed that these necessary safeguards would provide “a 
reasonable assurance that emergency measures restricting individual freedom will not 
degenerate into a permanent tyranny.” 
 While the “Freedom Manifesto” carefully avoided the ugly excesses of 
McCarthyism and overt reference to communism as the primary danger to cultural 
and intellectual freedom, Koestler’s hardline anti-communism and strident insistence 
on opposition to neutralism permeate the document. Though Koestler played a 
prominent role in shaping the formation of the CCF and its inaugural 1950 conference 
in Berlin, he quickly became a marginalized figure in the organization in the 
following years.43 Koestler’s increasingly marginalized position resulted primarily 
from Josselson’s decision to forgo his harshly militant anti-communism in favor of 
Ignazio Silone’s approach of urging the West to promote social and political reform 
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to mitigate the moral appeal to intellectuals that communism’s emphasis on social 
justice often held over capitalist democracy.44  
 The alternative approaches of Koestler’s rhetorical frontal assault on 
communism and Silone’s more gentle and subtle approach were put on display to 
Josselson and conference participants in their opening speeches, which provided two 
starkly different visions of what the Congress ought to be and do. Koestler wasted 
few words in stressing the urgency of the CCF’s mission and centered his speech on 
his desire that the organization represent a turning point when intellectuals abandoned 
their “contemplative detachment” and acknowledged the urgent international 
emergency generated by aggressive communist governments and the appeal of 
Western Communist Parties. To make clear his belief in the urgent importance of 
immediate action for the present situation, Koestler described the emergency using 
Ludwig van Beethoven’s words, “fate knocks at the gate of existence” and stressed 
that it was necessary for intellectuals to act with “the unhesitating assurance of an 
organic reflex.”45 In strong language, he scorned intellectuals who maintained neutral 
views towards totalitarian governments, such as the of the Soviet Union, famously 
describing them as, “clever imbeciles who preach neutrality toward the bubonic 
plague.”46   
 Contrasting with Koestler’s fierce rhetoric, Silone’s opening speech presented 
a more inclusive vision for the organization less focused on dogmatic anti-
communism and instead centered on incorporating a diversity of positions into the 
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effort to promote social and political reform in democratic nations. Directly attacking 
the rhetoric of Koestler and the more vigilant anti-communists of the Congress, 
Silone’s speech stressed that the organization would “intend to attack the problems of 
cultural liberty without the usual restrictions imposed by fanaticism or propaganda.”47 
While making certain to make no direct reference to Koestler, Silone derided those 
individuals who preferred to fight for cultural freedom rather than work towards 
solving the problems that thwarted it, proclaiming that “The best way of dealing with 
these problems is certainly to solve them-but those who lack courage, wisdom and 
daring seem to think that it would be easier and quicker to fight.”48  
While much of Silone’s speech amounted to a direct attack on Koestler and 
the hard-line anti-communists of the Congress, his position on the importance of 
having a diversity of views in the organization both tempered what would have 
otherwise been a more polarizing speech and served to provide an inclusive platform 
that would allow the CCF to face the new developments of the Cold War in the years 
to come. In describing the political and ideological divergences of the participants at 
the 1950 conference, Silone stressed that such differences could represent not the 
weakness but the strength of the organization. Describing the strength that could be 
drawn from this diversity in views, Silone remarked, ““The greatest contribution to 
freedom consists in the differentiation of the energies it stirs up. Freedom certainly 
does not exclude agreement but it does exclude synchronization.”49 Silone’s 
insistence that the synchronization of ideas in a democratic society, or the CCF, 
undermines its potential resonated with many participants at the Berlin conference 
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and would help to shape the primary outlook of the organization in the following 
years.50  
While the Congress fully embraced Silone’s emphasis on Western social and 
political reform to mitigate the appeal of communism, limits were placed on the 
“differentiation of energies” so that the Congress could achieve sufficient consensus 
with which the function as a coherent organization. With an organized structure in 
place and funding secured in the months after the 1950 Berlin conference, members 
of the Congress increasingly recognized that they would need more than a broad 
agreement on anti-communism in order to settle objectives and priorities.51 When the 
Executive Committee convened in February 1951 to discuss a proposal to hold 
another high profile conference in Paris in the mold of the one in Berlin, Raymond 
Aron mounted strong opposition. Aron contended that by imitating the Berlin 
conference and hosting another polemical event, the Congress would only draw 
attention to how little had been done in the eight months since the organization’s 
inaugural conference.52 For Aron and the other members of the Executive Committee 
who ultimately voted down the proposal, the polemics of the Berlin conference, 
however successful and exciting, provided little in the way of shaping the Congress 
into a coherent and vibrant organization with a long-term vision.  
In place of the polemics expressed at Berlin, the themes of “vital center” 
liberalism as a foundation for the Western cultural-intellectual tradition and a 
celebration of the “end of ideology” emerged as the primary basses for the CCF’s 
transatlantic intellectual consensus. As the Congress came to embrace Silone’s 
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emphasis on Western political and social reform, Koestler and his supporters, with 
their militant and sometimes reactionary anti-communism, were marginalized as the 
organization’s consensus became increasingly tied to the liberal “vital center.” During 
the postwar years, American style consensus liberalism of the “vital center” and the 
widespread celebration of an “end of ideology” had came to the forefront of 
intellectual discussion after decades of dogmatic ideology, propaganda, and war. 
Such developments provided much of the inspiration for the 1949 collection of essays 
The God That Failed. With essays penned by Louis Fischer, André Gide, Arthur 
Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Stephen Spender, and Richard Wright, all of whom would 
later participate in the CCF, The God That Failed detailed the well-known authors’ 
disillusionment with and abandonment of communism.53 While the Congress would 
draw heavily upon the theme of disillusionment with communism in espousing the 
“end of ideology,” the organization responded to the end of a monolithic Stalinist 
threat and the beginnings of détente by stressing the potential for social and political 
progress in a post-ideological age. When the “end of ideology” emerged as the basis 
of virtually all of the CCF’s activity in the years following the Berlin conference, 
proponents of the thesis expressed a decidedly optimistic mood, placing greater 
emphasis on the freedom from ideological dogmas than “the God that failed.”54  
As they turned away from the polemics of Berlin in favor of an emphasis on a 
positive interpretation of  “vital center” liberalism and freedom from ideological 
dogma, Josselson and the Executive Committee, comprised of Irving Brown Arthur 
Koestler, Eugen Kogon, Denis de Rougemont, David Rousset, Ignazio Silone, and 
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Stephen Spender, stressed the need to develop the Congress into a more permanent 
and ongoing operation.55 While Berlin had provided the Congress with a high-profile 
conference that brought together a significant contingent of Western intellectuals for 
a demonstration of solidarity against communism, intermittent conferences, whatever 
their profile, would not have provided the organization with the means to maintain 
this fragile transatlantic consensus. The Congress needed to establish a permanent 
intellectual locale, or series of locales, around which the organization’s transatlantic 
intellectual consensus could develop and coalesce. The Congress successfully 
established such permanent intellectual locales through the creation of a series of 
cultural-intellectual journals, which sought to maintain the highest cultural and 
literary standards while expressing the political positions and public identity of the 
organization on a regular basis.56 Among a family of magazines that would eventually 
include over twenty publications, Encounter, Preuves, and Tempo Presente soon 
established themselves in their respective markets and formed the core of the CCF’s 
ongoing operations. Seeking to combat the particularly pervasive communist support 
found in intellectual circles in France and Italy, Preuves, edited by François Bondy, 
and Tempo Presente, edited by Nicola Chiaromonte and Ignazio Silone, became 
essential to the CCF’s efforts in what it viewed as the two most “endangered” 
Western European nations.57  
While the Congress did not perceive the same degree of communist sympathy 
or support among British intellectuals as it did among French and Italian intellectuals, 
the pervasiveness of neutralism among the British intelligentsia and the de facto 
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status of English as an international language contributed to Encounter’s emergence 
as the foremost mouthpiece of the organization. Viewing Encounter’s potential 
readership as stretching beyond a British audience, Josselson and Secretary General 
Nicolas Nabokov stressed the importance of an English language journal that could 
reach intellectuals in Asia, and other regions, such as Scandinavia, where English was 
the second language and “neutralism is the strongest force.”58 Writing to proposed 
English co-editor, Stephen Spender in 1952, Josselson expressed his desire for 
Encounter to appeal to an international market, contending that “the Congress is not 
primarily interested in reaching readers in England and the US. because a communist 
or neutralist problem does not exist in those two countries.”59 Though perhaps 
underestimating the prevalence of British neutralism compared to the concerns 
expressed by his fellow members in the Congress, Josselson aptly recognized the 
value an internationally read English language journal could offer to the efforts of the 
Congress in establishing an international intellectual consensus.  In order to attract a 
broadly international Anglophone readership, Josselson stressed that Encounter 
would have to avoid the pitfalls of “Anglo-American provincialism.”60  
Despite Josselson’s relative lack of concern with the state of the British 
intelligentsia, other members of the Congress and the CIA expressed disappointment 
with the uninspiring British showing at the Berlin conference and a desire to address 
the rampant neutralism and simplistic anti-Americanism found among British 
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intellectuals.61 When the Executive Committee surveyed the state of British cultural-
intellectual journals following the 1950 Berlin conference, they noted the lack of a 
magazine expressing the organization’s position in the Cold War. With Cyril 
Connolly’s Horizon and John Lehmann’s Penguin New Writing ceasing publication in 
1950 and both Michael Oakeshott’s Cambridge Journal and F.R. Leavis’s Scrutiny 
closing their doors in 1953, the Congress viewed the state of the British cultural-
intellectual journal market as rather bleak. In the midst of these closings, Kingsley 
Martin’s overtly political and neutralist New Statesman and Nation became the most 
commercially successful among British literary journals with a left-of-center political 
perspective as it achieved a circulation of some 85,000.62  
After the meager success found in limited financial support of the heavily 
criticized The Twentieth Century, it became clear to the Executive Committee that it 
would have to establish its own British journal. As plans for a new journal developed 
within the Congress, support for a new “Anglo-American Left-of-Center publication” 
grew simultaneously within the CIA, the British Foreign Office’s Information 
Research Department (IRD), and the CCF’s headquarters in Paris.63 Both the CIA and 
leading members of the Congress were eager to discredit the neutralism prevalent 
among British intellectuals with a Congress journal intended to “engage in a 
permanent polemic with The New Statesman and Nation.”64 The CIA and many in the 
Paris office sought for Encounter to directly oppose the left-wing neutralism of New 
Statesman and its influence on British intellectuals while simultaneously desiring for 
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the journal to reach a broadly international audience of Anglophone intellectuals. 
With these often conflicting demands pulling them in different directions, 
Encounter’s editors regularly faced the challenges of walking the fine line between 
giving attention to the particulars of the British political and cultural landscape while 
avoiding the pitfalls of British provincialism.65 When forced to choose, the Paris-
based headquarters of the Congress and Encounter’s series of American co-editors 
regularly ensured that an international Atlanticist perspective won out over a 
narrowly British orientation.66   
Equally literary and political, Encounter was intended to portray an 
internationalist, anti-communist, anti-neutralist ethos by drawing on a distinguished 
NCL stable of writers from the UK, continental Europe and the US.67 Initially edited 
by the English poet, novelist and essayist, Stephen Spender, and the American 
journalist, Irving Kristol, Encounter initially struggled but soon after established its 
respectability and attracted distinguished contributors largely on the merits of its 
cultural offerings. Despite the view of later co-editor Melvin Lasky that Spender’s 
focus on literary and cultural pieces was a bunch of “Elizabeth Bowen and all that 
crap,” many, such as Isaiah Berlin, believed that it was Spender and his insistence on 
the magazine’s cultural emphasis that provided it with a “certificate of respectability 
to the British intelligentsia.” 68 
Appearing alongside highly regarded poetry, short works of literature, book 
reviews and other cultural works, Encounter’s political articles often emphasized not 
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only the threats posed by communism to cultural freedom but also the danger of 
detached neutralism in the ideological showdown between the US and Soviet Union. 
In contrast to France, Italy, and other Western European nations with powerful 
Communist Parties, the relatively small number of British Communist Party members 
and fellow travelers represented less of a concern for the Congress than the neutralist 
positions widespread among the British intelligentsia. In its aim to convince readers 
of the “follies of neutralism” Encounter embraced the rhetoric of American actor 
Robert Montgomery, who had declared at the 1950 Berlin conference “there is no 
neutral corner in Freedom’s room.”69 
When the first issue of Encounter arrived in October of 1953, its opening 
editorial, “After the Apocalypse,” clearly articulated both the journal’s anti-neutralist 
position and its insistence on drawing upon a diversity of voices to combat the 
dangers of neutralism and communism.70 Published only six months after the death of 
Stalin, this de facto mission statement depicted a world scene no longer featuring 
Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin as heralding in an epic period of transformation 
providing tremendous prospects and risks for the fate of the West and its 
intelligentsia. The editorial’s authors highlighted a recent uprising of “real factory 
workers” in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia whose actions “unambiguously 
dissociated themselves from a hypothetical Proletariat, achieving by that simple 
action what a thousand subtle arguments could not do: the destruction of the Marxist-
Leninist creed.”71 In light of such events and the death of an earlier generation of 
dictators, the editorial’s authors expressed their hopes that “perhaps, words will again 
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mean what they say, and we shall be spared the tedious sophistry by which despotism 
could pose as a higher form of freedom, murder as a supreme humanism.”72 While 
emphasizing the considerable opportunity for positive change in this transformative 
period, the authors made clear their dissatisfaction with the status quo of communist 
influence, poetically lamenting, “The dark side of the moon may no longer be 
mistaken for the rising sun, but it is still there and still dark.”73  
Appearing at a time both promising and perilous, the opening editorial 
provided a stark contrast with the utilization of art and culture demanded by the 
Soviet policy of Socialist Realism with the insistence that Encounter sought to 
“promote no line” and regarded “literature and the arts as being values in themselves, 
in need of no ulterior justification.”74 The editorial’s authors proudly reported a 
distinguished and international list of honorary chairmen containing Benedetto Croce, 
John Dewey, Karl Jaspers, Salvador de Madariaga, Jacques Maritain, and Bertrand 
Russel as evidence of the diversity of distinguished voices represented by the journal. 
Imbued by Silone’s emphasis on a “differentiation of energies”, the authors 
contended that only two things brought together this often divisive group to a “middle 
ground”: “a love of liberty and a respect for that part of human endeavor that goes by 
the name of culture.”75 
In response to initial criticism from a number of leading British intellectuals 
and the Times Literary Supplement that it espoused a negative-liberalism consisting 
primarily of opposition to and fear of communism, Encounter shifted towards a more 
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positive interpretation of “vital center” liberalism that stressed this political 
philosophy’s progressive potential. By interpreting vital center “liberalism” in a more 
positive manner and showcasing its high standard of cultural and literary work, 
Encounter quickly turned around many of the critical assessments received in its 
infancy.76 With the often-militant co-editor Iriving Kristol pushed by the central 
office in Paris to moderate his negative anti-communism and further accommodate 
the well regarded cultural and literary offerings of co-editor Stephen Spender, 
Encounter’s editors reported to Paris in 1957 that the harsh critiques of the early 
issues were no longer being received and that “the most eloquent of our critics, like 
A.J.P. Taylor and Graham Hough, now contribute happily.”77 The following year, 
Kristol and Spender delightedly informed the Executive committee that Encounter’s 
circulation had reached almost 16,000; making it the most widely circulated cultural-
intellectual review of its kind in the English language. By avoiding the pitfalls of 
British provincialism, an over emphasis on militant anti-communism, and 
highlighting the well regarded cultural and literary work found in the journal, Kristol 
realized his ambition of establishing Encounter as “the English-language cultural 
periodical.”78 Echoing Kristol’s assessment of Encounter’s leading position among 
Anglophone cultural-intellectual journals, Raymond Aron later wrote that 
“Encounter…remains…the first, the best monthly review in English.”79 Pleased with 
the success and influence achieved by the journal, Josselson stressed the importance 
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of Encounter to the Congress, writing in 1964 the organization had “always 
considered Encounter to be our greatest asset.”80 
In the wake of Stalin’s death and the crumbling of world communism as a 
Soviet-centered monolith, Encounter further moderated its militant anti-communism 
and placed greater emphasis on a positive interpretation of “vital center” liberalism 
and an outlook molded around the “end of ideology.”81 A high profile 1954 series of 
articles, “Democracy and its Discontents” noted existing social and political problems 
in Western democracies but emphasized the ability of “vital center” liberalism to 
adapt to change and social pressures.82 In 1955, a follow up series, “The Intellectuals” 
examined the newly important role of intellectuals whose abilities were required by 
the increasingly technocratic approach of postwar liberalism to politics and 
governance.83 In their charting of the significant social changes taking place in most 
major Western democracies, this series of articles embraced the technocratic role of 
intellectuals in postwar society. In his contribution to the series, Golo Mann presented 
both the transatlantic identity shared by Western intellectuals and their increasingly 
technocratic position in society as forgone conclusions, contending that “the age-old 
conflict between the Western and the ‘pure German’ intellectual has died down, for 
everybody is somehow pro-Western now and everybody a good German to boot.”84 
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Despite the contention of Dissent editor Lewis Coser that in a context in which 
“world Communism no longer exists as a unified political force of ideological vision” 
and “Western Europe is no longer menaced by either Soviet expansion or internal 
Communist takeover” that the static raison d’être of the Congress no longer had a 
place, contributors to Encounter demonstrated that “vital center” liberalism and the 
“end of ideology” provided resilient platforms able to adapt to these new 
circumstances.85  
Providing one of the most comprehensive reactions found in Encounter to 
both the end of monolithic Stalinism and the nascent emergence of détente, Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr., who originally coined the “vital center” label and would soon after 
serve as a sort of “court historian” for the Kennedy Administration, demonstrated the 
resiliency of “vital center” liberalism and the “end of ideology” in facing the newly 
transformed circumstances of the Cold War in his article “Varieties of Communist 
Experience.”86 In titling the article and setting its tone, Schlesinger drew on the title 
of William James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience to evoke the same 
communism as religion theme found earlier in The God that Failed. His article stands 
in contrast to the contentions later made by Coser and other critics that members of 
the Congress maintained into the 1960s a static Cold War logic formed in the early 
postwar years. In his recognition of the ways in which the Cold War had changed, he 
sought to demonstrate how the adaptable platform of “vital center” liberalism 
provided the means to encourage Soviet reform and the development of peaceful co-
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existence between East and West.87 He outlined the contours of a reformed Soviet 
Union further committed to the “consumer-goods-merry-go-round” that largely 
relinquished the “interior tyranny” of Stalin and thus no longer required the “external 
crisis” of international tension to reconcile its people with State repression.88 In light 
of what he believed to be a genuine interest in pursuing détente on the part of Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev, he maintained that to deal with Khrushchev with the 
same policies developed in the age of Stalin would represent a tremendous missed 
opportunity to encourage reform and develop contact with the Soviet Union.89 In 
responding to a potential easing of tensions, Schlesinger’s position in the liberal “vital 
center” allowed him to strike a balance between ardently maintaining an anti-
communist perspective while encouraging further development of the American-
Soviet relationship by encouraging reform in the Soviet Union. While the militant 
rhetoric and hardline anti-communism of Arthur Koestler and other members who 
enjoyed prominence in the early years of the Congress may have had a place in the 
age of Stalin, their approach would have precluded the balancing act described by 
Schlesinger as necessary to take advantage of new opportunities in a strikingly 
different Cold War.  
Though ready to engage an easing of tensions between the U.S. and Soviet 
Union that figures such as Koestler would have categorically rejected, Schlesinger 
stressed this position of negotiating with the Soviet Union from the “vital center” did 
not entail conceding Western interests at all costs for the sake of furthering the U.S.-
Soviet relationship. While insisting that détente should not be pursued on grounds 
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that would endanger vital Western interests, such as the independence of West Berlin 
and West Germany, he maintained that, in general, significant reform in the Soviet 
Union would greatly benefit the interests of the West. Framed within a broader 
discussion of the emerging semi-liberal reforms and relatively non-totalitarian 
communist systems in Poland and Yugoslavia, Schlesinger argued that the Polish-
Yugoslav reforms provided an excellent model of what the West should encourage in 
the Soviet Union and that only through a relaxation of international tensions would 
such reforms be possible. 90  
While insisting that the US and its allies needed to be carful in how they 
pursued détente, Schlesinger remained adamant that, on the whole, increased contact 
and a relaxation of tension offered at least as many benefits to the West as it did to the 
East. Utilizing a limited interpretation of Silone’s “differentiation of energies” and a 
full embrace of his encouragement of social and political reform as the most powerful 
tools of the West in the Cold War struggle, Schlesinger drew upon a positive 
interpretation of “vital center” liberalism in his interpretation of détente as a process 
of encouraging pluralism and tolerance that would “dissolve the ideological 
dogmatism of Soviet society.”91 In response to militant Cold Warriors who contended 
that a plan to face the Soviet Union with tolerance and reconciliation rather than 
confrontation represented a position of weakness, Schlesinger defended the power of 
encouraging more normative relations, elegantly writing, “Normality seems a weak 
and sketchy emotion, but, given time, it can split a monolith as ivy can split a block of 
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An opposition to the popular tendency to rigidly divide the world between 
“democratic” or “capitalist” and the “socialist” or “communist” significantly 
contributed to Schlesinger’s approach to the Cold War and his support for détente.93 
Embracing the “end of ideology” thesis put forward by Daniel Bell and other leading 
members of the Congress, he argued that by assuming that “these platonic essences 
are more ‘real’ than their confused and imperfect approximations in the concrete 
experience of contemporary society” both West and East have ignored Bell’s 
recognition that in the twentieth century “‘capitalism’ only survived by strong 
injections of ‘collectivism,’ and ‘collectivism’ only survived by strong injections of 
‘capitalism.’”94 Schlesinger demanded his Western readers to “reject the mystique of 
Either/Or, and lead the world back to intellectual sanity.”95 Appealing to the shared 
cultural-intellectual tradition of the US and Europe, he maintained that Westerners 
have a generally “pragmatic” and “pluralistic” tradition and only become “dogmatists 
and monists” in times of emergency and panic.96 In his embrace of the “pragmatic” 
Western intellectual tradition, Schlesinger stressed the importance of how living up to 
the ideals of the this tradition could encourage reform in the East when he rhetorically 
asked how one could hope to “restrain others from turning into raving ideologues” if 
the West itself were to “abandon the empirical approach to life” in its dealings with 
the East.97  
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In his insistence that the US and its allies must not abandon the cherished 
ideals of the Western cultural-intellectual tradition in their relations with the East, 
Schlesinger laid out a plan for confronting the Soviet Union that clearly distinguished 
himself from hawkish Cold Warriors represented in the nascent Congress by Arthur 
Koestler. By encouraging the West to embrace its cultural, intellectual, and political 
ideals in its relations with the Soviet Union, he demonstrated how the transatlantic 
intellectual consensus of the Congress around liberalism of the “vital center” as a 
foundation for the Western cultural-intellectual tradition represented not only an asset 
to be protected but also a valuable tool to be employed in the Cold War. Schlesinger 
maintained that by engaging the Soviet Union within the framework of the 
“pragmatic” Western intellectual tradition, the Congress would not only protect and 
promote this tradition but further the development of détente by diminishing the roles 
of “raving ideologues” on both the Eastern and Western sides of the negotiating 
table.98 In the context of pluralistic communism and the emergence of détente in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, Schlesinger demonstrated that the Congress could project 
the strength of the its transatlantic intellectual consensus by approaching the Soviet 
Union in terms of the “end of ideology” and by way of a liberal “vital center.”  
Providing another of Encounter’s more comprehensive treatments of the 
changing circumstances of the Cold War, Richard Löwenthal addressed a détente that 
had become increasingly mature since 1960 in his two-part 1965 article, “Has the 
Revolution a Future?”99 Löwenthal, the journal’s principal contributor of coverage on 
international politics, began his article with the ready pronouncement that “The 
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History of World Communism, conceived as a united movement with a common 
doctrine and strategy formulated from a single center, is at an end.”100 Though his 
article primarily focused on developments in the communist world, he provided 
glimpses into the potential to be found in engaging the East from the perspective of 
the liberal “vital center.”101 While noting the potential challenges to Western interests 
presented by new developments in the Cold War, Löwenthal ultimately emphasized 
the ways in which the West’s liberalism of the “vital center” could adapt to and 
benefit from such circumstances.  
In particular, he pointed to Khrushchev’s efforts in de-Stalinization along with 
the resulting test of the Soviet government’s pretense of infallibility and control over 
the Soviet Bloc as key developments in the Cold War.102 On one hand, the relative 
decline of Soviet control and cohesiveness among the Warsaw Pact nations provided 
an obvious edge to the Western democracies of NATO in the Cold War struggle. On 
the other hand, a decrease in Soviet control of the Communist Bloc meant greater 
autonomy for Western Communist Parties and greater potential to attract the support 
of European intellectuals wary of a Soviet puppet. While noting the complex nuances 
of differing national contexts, Löwenthal centered his analysis of the potentially 
positive future prospects for Western Communist Parties on the Italian Communist 
Party (PCI), which believed that “visible proof” of its independence from the Kremlin 
would remove the primary obstacle along the “peaceful road” to power.103    
Assessing the differences between Khrushchev and Stalin, Löwenthal 
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highlighted the significance of Khrushchev’s domestic reforms and in doing so 
painted a complex picture of a new Soviet leader less focused on the abstract theory 
of world revolution and more focused on pragmatic economic development. 
Withholding blanket endorsement for Khrushchev’s Soviet Union as an automatic 
improvement over its Stalinist predecessor, Löwenthal insisted that while trends 
toward a de-ideologized Soviet regime should be acknowledged and encouraged, it 
would be “foolish” and “dangerous” for the West to regard such changes as complete 
before the existence of “direct and unmistakable proofs”.104 Echoing Schlesinger’s 
earlier recognition of the increasing political and economic orientation of the Soviet 
Union towards consumer goods, Löwenthal ’s analysis of the reforms undertaken by 
Khrushchev stressed the Soviet tendency towards abandoning Stalin’s “deliberate use 
of state power as an agent of transformation” in the form of “mass terrorism” towards 
a focus on material incentives for the ordinary industrial and agricultural worker.105 
His analysis of Kruschev’s apparent emphasis on material benefits for Soviet citizens 
over pursuit of world revolution stressed that while this trend did not yet represent an 
accomplished fact, a Soviet regime more focused on fostering a climate of stability 
than permanent tension nonetheless represented a tremendous opportunity for the 
West to further normalize its relationship with the Soviet Union and press for greater 
reform.106 By approaching the Soviet Union via the nuanced anti-communism of the 
liberal “vital center,” Löwenthal, like Schlesinger, found the means to encourage 
Soviet reform when militant anti-communists in the mold of Arthur Koestler would 
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have simply written off any such engagement as being weak on communism.”107 
As with the opportunities and challenges provided by the greater autonomy of 
Western Communist Parties from the Kremlin, Löwenthal framed his discussion of a 
less ideological Soviet Union in terms of the obstacles and possibilities this 
development entailed for the West, and consequently the Congress. Throughout the 
article, Löwenthal avoided the popular tendency to view the Cold War as either a 
strictly ideological struggle or as an essentially geo-political confrontation between 
the world’s two superpowers. Employing a sophisticated understanding of the Cold 
War, Löwenthal faced the task of reconciling encouragement of seemingly liberal 
reforms in the Soviet Union with the danger of presenting such reforms as complete 
and consequently depicting the Soviet Union as a harmless potential ally of the 
West.108  While he acknowledged the opportunities and potential benefits to the West 
in encouraging Soviet reform, his careful insistence on highlighting the 
incompleteness of such reform as well as the often-aggressive position of Russian 
national interests marked Löwenthal ’s intention to reach out to neutralists and ensure 
that they did not view the Soviet Union as an increasingly harmless player in the Cold 
War struggle. 
In concluding his two-part article Löwenthal came to apply the “end of 
ideology” not only to the capitalist West but also the communist East with the 
contention that in light of pluralistic communism and the Soviet de-emphasis of 
ideology “’world revolution no longer has a clearly defined meaning.”109 Though by 
no means contending that ideology had been discredited and displaced in the 
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Communist Bloc to the degree that such an “end of ideology” had occurred in the 
West, his analysis of the Soviet turn from ideological devotion drew upon the wide-
ranging efforts of members of the Congress to describe the “end of ideology” in the 
West and the inevitable turn of the East to a similar direction. Drawing upon 
influential works from the CCF’s “end of ideology” canon such as Bertrand de 
Jouvenel’s “Some Fundamental Similarities between the Soviet and Capitalistic 
Economic Systems,” Löwenthal stressed the importance of calmly assessing the 
implications of liberalization in the Soviet system for the West.110 Whereas Koestler 
and his fellow militant rhetoricians at the 1950 Berlin Conference would not have 
engaged in the objective analysis necessary to identify and take advantage of new 
developments in the Communist world, Löwenthal and the “end of ideology” 
proponents who had come to the fore of the Congress calmly identified such openings 
by viewing Soviet communism not as an intrinsic evil but rather as a socio-economic 
phenomenon to be examined.111 In “calmly” examining the socio-economic 
implications of Soviet reform, Löwenthal’s perspective from the liberal “vital center” 
allowed him to negotiate the demands of encouraging liberal reform in the Soviet 
Union while maintaining a position of strength that did not concede vital Western 
interests.  
While other developments of the 1960s would significantly challenge the 
transatlantic intellectual consensus around liberalism of the “vital center” as a 
necessary foundation of the Western cultural-intellectual tradition, Löwenthal , 
Schlesinger, and other leading contributors to Encounter demonstrated that “vital 
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center” liberalism and the “end of ideology” provided the Congress with the means to 
adapt to the end of a monolithic Stalinist threat and the emergence of détente. While 
insisting that liberals, by their very nature, must oppose communism, Schlesinger and 
the Congress promoted a “rational anti-communism” and rejected the “obsessive anti-
communism” that remained on the table of the CCF’s approaches to the Cold War in 
its early years.112 By applying a positive interpretation of “vital center” liberalism and 
embracing the “end of ideology” thesis, the Congress found the means to avoid 
engaging a transformed Cold War “in terms of stereotypes and strategies left over 
from the fight a generation ago against Stalinism.”113 While the Congress benefited 
from greater solidarity as these Cold War developments pushed the organization 
towards a firmer embrace of consensus around “vital center” liberalism, the 
emergence of a radical New Left in the 1960s challenged this form of liberalism as it 
questioned whether the “end of ideology” represented a positive development. Unable 
to address many of the issues raised by the New Left, and recognizing their own 
culpability in setting the ground the for this movement’s radicalism, leading figures in 
the Congress came to question the value of “vital center” liberalism and the “end of 
ideology” themselves.  
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The “End of Ideology,” the New Left, and the Fragmentation of the 
“Vital Center” 
 
While a consensus rooted in “vital center” liberalism and drawn heavily from 
Daniel Bell’s “end of ideology” allowed the Congress to adapt to challenges 
presented by the end of a monolithic Stalinist threat and the emergence of détente, the 
emerging New Left challenged this consensus as it came to question the value of a 
liberal “vital center” and ideological exhaustion. The “end of ideology” came to the 
fore of the CCF’s consensus at the organization’s 1955 conference in Milan and 
marked a significant change of direction from the themes of the inaugural 1950 
conference in Berlin. Whereas Berlin had been a rallying call to Western intellectuals 
to defend their intellectual heritage in the face of actual or potential repression, Milan 
displayed a detachment from the earlier conference’s aggressive positions and 
rhetoric. With the new circumstances of the Cold War and the need for greater 
consensus leading the Congress away from the polemics of Berlin, participants at the 
Milan conference viewed Soviet communism less as an immoral potential aggressor 
and more as a socio-economic phenomenon to be examined. The aggressive positions 
of the Berlin conference as espoused by Arthur Koestler and other key figures had 
roots in the political struggles of the 1930s. Milan, on the other hand, displayed 
greater resonance with the issues of a post-Stalinist Cold War.114 While anti-
communism had been thematic at Berlin, by the time of the Milan conference in 
1955, it had become a presupposition.115 
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Though finding its most comprehensive treatment in Bell’s seminal 1960 
work, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, the 
“end of ideology” thesis originated from a broad contingency of leading figures in the 
Congress who by 1955 had a certain air of complacency that “communism had lost 
the battle of ideas” and viewed the Milan conference as a sort of “post-victory 
celebration.”116 Though expressing the theme with subtle variations, Bell along with 
Raymond Aron, Seymour Lipset, Edward Shils, and other influential members of the 
Congress advanced the “end of ideology” thesis through much of their work in the 
mid-to-late 1950s. At its root, the “end of ideology” suggested that a clear dichotomy 
of capitalism and socialism had become blurred by a greater acceptance across the 
political spectrum of state intervention in the economy.117 For proponents of the “end 
of ideology,” the ascendancy of a mixed economy and the social welfare state meant 
that, according to Lipset, “the ideological issues dividing left and right had been 
reduced to a little more or a little less government ownership and economic 
planning.”118 Explaining his view that the great political and ideological questions of 
the past had become policy issues of a technical nature, Lipset pointed to a dramatic 
shift in Western politics:  
The fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been 
solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the 
conservatives have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has 
recognized that an increase in over-all state power carries with it more dangers 
to freedom than solutions for economic problems. This very triumph of the 
democratic social revolution in the West ends domestic politics for those 
intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political 
action.119  
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Expressing a seemingly smug satisfaction with the social, political, and economic 
structure of the status quo, Lipset along with Aron, Bells, and Shils intended for the 
1955 Milan conference to provide a launching point for the theme that would come to 
form the basis of the organization’s activity for the remainder of its existence.120 
 Foremost among the challenges in forming a broad consensus around the “end 
of ideology” was the necessary task of convincing the wider intellectual community 
of the West that the “end of ideology” did not simply imply a conservative support 
for existing political, economic, and social circumstances. Drawing on many of the 
same concepts that would come to form the basis of fellow Congress participant J.K. 
Galbraith’s influential 1958 work, The Affluent Society, proponents of the “end of 
ideology” stressed the potential for a large-scale technocratic approach to solve the 
vast array of socio-economic problems found in a modern industrial society.121 In 
their view, technocrats had achieved their deserved ascendency in the wake of 
developed welfare-state capitalism and the end of scarcity. In this technocratic age, a 
classless society was being achieved by non-revolutionary means as the “articulators 
of ideologies” gave way to empirically motivated “engineers of cooperation.”122  
Contrary to critics who saw a conservative support of the status quo, “end of 
ideology” proponents viewed themselves not as reactionaries but rather as existing at 
the forefront of progressive political discourse. Lipset considered himself “a man of 
the left” and Bell contended that the perspective he subscribed to was “anti-
ideological, but not conservative” on the basis that “a repudiation of ideology, to be 
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meaningful, must not mean only criticism of the utopian order but of existing society 
as well.” Aron, Bell, Lipset, Shils, and the other leading figures who brought the “end 
of ideology” to the center of the CCF’ transatlantic intellectual consensus exerted 
considerable energy in framing the approach as non-conservative. Despite these 
efforts, when the New Left emerged in the decade following the 1955 Milan 
Conference, the radical intellectuals of the Movement remained unconvinced that 
support for the “end of ideology” represented anything other than a reactionary 
embrace of the existing circumstances of postwar liberalism. As leading figures of the 
New Left came to greater prominence in the Western intellectual landscape they 
recognized the development of the “end of ideology” but came to see it not as a 
positive development but rather as a circumstance that would have to be overcome in 
order for social and political progress to be achieved. 
 The New Left’s perception of the Congress and its support for the “end of 
ideology” as conservative intensified as a number of Congress members associated 
with the New York Intellectuals began a rightward drift away from the liberal “vital 
center” and towards neoconservatism . This rightward turn occurred as these 
members came to terms with their own responsibility in setting the ground for the 
New Left’s radicalism and emphasized the need to protect cherished liberal values 
they viewed as greatly endangered by such radicalism. For onlookers of the New 
Left, the conservative turn of former “vital center” liberals who championed the “end 
of ideology” further accentuated the conservative basis upon which such notions of 
ideological exhaustion were founded. While the bulk of his fellow New York 
intellectuals moved to the right of the “vital center” in response to the New Left, 
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prominent Congress contributor Dwight Macdonald sided with student radicals and 
challenged “vital center” liberalism from the left. Whether abandoned for positions 
further to the right or to the left, the increasing difficulty faced by the Congress in 
maintaining the “vital center” as a broad political umbrella under which to foster 
consensus around “vital center” liberalism as a necessary foundation of the Western 
cultural-intellectual came under tremendous strain.  
In the years prior to the New Left’s entry into the Western intellectual 
landscape, the “end of ideology” emerged alongside “vital center” liberalism at the 
core of the CCF’s transnational intellectual consensus at the 1955 “The Future of 
Freedom” conference in Milan. Reporting on the proceedings and ideas of the 
conference in his “Letter from Milan: The End of Ideology” in the November, 1955 
issue of Encounter, Shils made sure to emphasize the non-conservative nature of the 
“end of ideology” with the assertion that “an attachment to moderation in action and 
orderliness and stability in change” should not entail an “uncritical acceptance of 
tradition.”123 In his brief highlighting of the many papers presented at Milan, Shils 
emphasized the importance of “representatives of American sociological wisdom” for 
an “end of ideology” thesis rooted in a notion of social science as providing empirical 
and technocratic solutions to what had previously been seen as political or ideological 
issues. In accordance with the rising prominence of social science and its acceptance 
as a field of empirical study in the 1950s, he bolstered the objective credentials of a 
sociological approach, writing that the papers in this mold were “sometimes turgid 
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and seldom elegant but [brought] to the conference an insistent independence of 
thought and an original feeling for the reality of social life.”124 
In addition to the valuable contributions of American sociologists, Shils 
devoted considerable attention to Raymond Aron’s paper on the ways in which the 
foundations of the great ideological conflicts of the first part of the twentieth century 
had largely disappeared. For Aron, the once clear distinction between “right” and 
“left” became blurred by the development of combinations of circumstances 
previously alleged by ideologues to be impossible. Among the examples of 
previously unimaginable combinations listed by Aron were the co-existence of public 
ownership and tyranny, full employment in a capitalist economy, and extensive 
government regulations with public liberties. In particular, he pointed to an awareness 
that nationalization was not a universal solution for economic problems and that 
British socialism had not led to tyranny as fundamentally weakening the viability of 
pure socialism and pure neo-liberalism as political and economic philosophies.125  
Echoing the sentiment expressed by a number of conference participants, 
Shils depicted the atmosphere in Milan as something like a “post-victory ball” over 
communist ideology.126 Further supporting his impression that the conferees 
displayed none of the defensiveness towards communism displayed at earlier 
Congress conferences, he described an attitude towards McCarthyism that lacked the 
anxiety towards communist subversion previously displayed by liberals and 
conservatives alike. Struck by the general lack of concern towards the potential of 
communist influence in the West displayed in conference papers, Shils rhetorically 
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asked, “Have Communists come to appear so preposterous to our Western 
intellectuals that it is no longer conceivable that they could be effectively 
subversive?”127  
Hoping to check potentially undue complacency on the part of Western 
intellectuals espousing the “end of ideology,” Shils contended that the Milan 
conference demonstrated that much work remained to be done as intellectuals needed 
to avoid the temptation “to construct new ideologies, as rigid, as eager for consistency 
and for universal observance as those which have been now transcended.”128 
Seemingly forecasting the New Left that would emerge in the years following the 
Milan conference, he warned that seeking to undo all of the “old errors” by simply 
moving in the opposite direction will only “rehabilitate the need for ideology; it will 
creep in through the back door, or more particularly, through a rebellious younger 
generation.”129 Along with prescriptions on how to avoid the pitfalls of ideology, 
Shills concluded his article with an assertion that the “end of ideology” need not 
imply a reactionary position. Insisting that in rejecting ideologies intellectuals must 
examine what should be salvaged from them, Shils failed to offer any specificity as to 
how such choices ought to be made or how one could critically question the structural 
issues of a society in which, as Lipset contended, “the fundamental political problems 
of the industrial revolution have been solved.”130 Though he conceded that every 
society needs a certain amount of ideals drawn from “grandiose visions,” such glib 
pronouncements would offer little assurance to the intellectuals of the New Left when 
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they later came to prominence in the 1960s that there was any substantial room to 
question the seemingly complete solutions of the mixed economy and the social-
welfare state.131  
Building on the paper he presented at the Milan conference, along with 
several other articles on the theme written in subsequent years, Daniel Bell further 
developed the “end of ideology” in his 1960 book-length treatment of the thesis in 
The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. Primarily 
focused on recent developments in the developed West, Bell contended that the 1950s 
saw an exhaustion of the major nineteenth century ideologies, particularly Marxism, 
as intellectual systems that claimed the universal truth of their views of the world. In 
celebrating the end of the ideological age as a positive development, Bell made 
certain to stress that his anti-ideological perspective did not represent a conservative 
position. Bell sought to demonstrate his perspective as non-conservative by 
contrasting the “end of ideology” with nineteenth century ideologies he represented 
as compelling the total intellectual and emotional commitment of the masses and 
leading intellectuals to fear the masses or any significant form of social action. Bell 
saw this fear of the masses and social action as the basis for neo-conservative politics 
and distinguished the “end of ideology” from the neo-conservative movement that 
would attract significant numbers of ex-radicals, including a number of leading 
members of the Congress, by insisting on the importance of criticizing not only “the 
utopian order” but also the existing circumstances of society.132   
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Still, as with Lipset, Bell offered little insight into how to balance a criticism 
of utopian aspirations and existing circumstances while providing even less indication 
of how one could critically question an existing order viewed as having solved the 
major issues faced by society. Providing little more than minimal assurances that the 
“end of ideology” did not imply an end of critically questioning the status quo of the 
mixed economy and the welfare-state, he focused instead on establishing the “end of 
ideology” as an empirical development of twentieth century history. For Bell, 
calamities such as the Moscow Show Trials, the Nazi-Soviet pact, and the 
suppression of striking Hungarian workers had destroyed the mythic attraction of 
communism for intellectuals. On the other side of the ideological spectrum, Bell 
noted how the ascendancy of the Welfare State had eroded the allure of pure laissez 
faire capitalism. In light of these developments, Bell saw in the emergence of 
youthful radicalism, a generation of intellectuals “with no meaningful memory of 
these old debates” that “finds itself seeking new purposes within a framework of 
political society that had rejected, intellectually speaking, the old apocalyptic and 
chiliastic visions.”133  
Bell’s insistence that support for the “end of ideology” did not stem from 
reactionary politics benefited little from his assertion in the concluding pages of the 
book that the virtual non-existence of opportunity or reason for radical criticism had 
led young radicals to a failing search for a “cause” with “a deep, desperate, almost 
pathetic anger.”134 The irrelevance of “old politico-economic radicalism,” such as the 
nationalization of industry, and the inability of politics to address the “stultifying 
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aspects of contemporary culture,” such as television, were highlighted by Bell as key 
reasons for the limited viability of radical criticism. Additionally, he completed his 
depiction of a bleak landscape for radicalism with the assertion that the working class 
viewed the existing circumstances of society with more satisfaction than did the 
intellectuals. For Bell, “the workers have not achieved utopia, but their expectations 
were less than those of the intellectuals, and the gains correspondingly larger.”135  
Directly addressing the New Left in the concluding pages of the work, Bell 
again asserted that the “end of ideology” was not, and should not be, the “end of 
utopia.”136 He claimed that while utopia is always needed to provide society with a 
vision of its potential, “the ladder to the City of Heaven can no longer be a ‘faith 
ladder,’ but [must now be] an empirical one.” In stark contrast to his prescribed 
“empirical ladder,” Bell rejected the “easy left formulae” for social change he viewed 
as the guiding principle of the emerging New Left. Owing to its abhorrence of the 
empirical approach of technocracy, the New Left received ardent criticism from Bell 
for exuberating great passion and energy but providing little in way of a definable 
plan for the future. Questioning those of the New Left who self-congratulated simply 
for “being on the move,” he sought concrete answers to what they meant by 
socialism, how they intended to guard against bureaucratization, and what they meant 
by democratic planning or worker’s control. For Bell, the hard thought required by 
these questions gave way to answers from the New Left comprised only of “bravura 
phrases.”137  
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With the view that the structural questions of society had been largely settled 
in the West, leaving little room remaining for radicalism, Bell’s concern towards the 
naïve and simplistic radicalism he saw in the New Left consisted primarily of the 
movement’s attitude towards Third World revolutions. In particular he looked to the 
positions of those in the New Left towards Cuba and the newly independent nations 
of Africa as evidence for the intellectual immaturity he perceived in the movement. 
Completing his indictment of the New Left for simplistic rhetoric and ignoring recent 
historical developments, Bell wrote, “among the ‘new Left,’ there is an alarming 
readiness to create a tabula rasa, to accept the word ‘Revolution’ as an absolution for 
outrages, to justify the suppression of civil rights and opposition—in short, to erase 
the lessons of the last forty years with an emotional alacrity that is astounding.”138  
Foremost among Bell’s critics, American sociologist C. Wright Mills ardently 
challenged the notion of ideological exhaustion as a positive development in his 
“Letter to the New Left.” Writing for the British The New Left Review in 1960, Mills 
began his letter by expressing the common values shared between himself and a New 
Left audience that would allow him to simply “get on with it.”139 Clearly unconvinced 
by Bell’s arguments that the support for “end of ideology” did not represent a 
conservative position, Mills viewed the thesis as a passing “intellectual fashion” that 
was in effect an “intellectual celebration of apathy.”140 Mills attributed the 
development and popularization of the “end of ideology” theme to the Congress, 
Encounter, and the 1955 Milan conference and proceeded to assert the theme as only 
liberal in its rhetoric, not in its substance. In describing the “snobbish assumptions” 
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held by “end of ideology” practitioners, Mills contended how a liberal tone, lacking 
actual liberal ideas, made it appear as if “the New Yorker style of reportage has 
become politically triumphant.”141 Describing the “end of ideology” as making a 
“fetish of empiricism, ” Mills wrote, “The facts are duly weighed, carefully balanced, 
always hedged. Their power to outrage, their power truly to enlighten in a political 
way, their power to aid decision, even their power to clarify some situation—all that 
is blunted or destroyed.”142 For Mills, the powerlessness of this form of empiricism 
resulted in reason collapsing into an undue compulsion for reasonableness.143  
Contending that proponents of the “end of ideology” “do of course smuggle in 
general ideas” despite their ostensible opposition to ideology, Mills viewed the “end 
of ideology” as resting ultimately on disillusionment with any recognizable form of 
socialism.144 In his assessment of the potential for social change to be found in the 
“end of ideology,” Mills saw none of the room for “utopian thinking” touted by Bell, 
and saw instead a self-congratulatory embrace of the Western welfare state with little 
to no application anywhere outside of the NATO bloc. Mills depicted the narrowly 
focused “end of ideology” practitioners as reflecting the self-image of a small circle 
of intellectuals from the developed West who were, in essence, attempting to apply 
the “consensus of a few provincials about their own immediate and provincial 
position” to the broader society of the West.145  
Taking his view on the reactionary nature of support for  “the end of 
ideology” further than most critiques, Mills stressed the similarities between the 
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demands of the “end of ideology” and those of socialist realism in the Soviet Union. 
In describing a series of interviews he conducted in Uzbekistan and Georgia with 
Soviet intellectuals concerning socialist realism, Mills described himself as coming 
away from the interviews thinking “This man talks in a style just like Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr.” and “Surely this fellow’s the counterpart of Daniel Bell.”146 For 
Mills, such striking similarities stemmed from the way in which socialist realism 
rested on an optimistic notion of communism as a providing all encompassing 
solutions and the “end of ideology” embraced an optimistic view of the mixed 
economy and welfare state to provide such solutions. With their general support of 
the status quo and an optimistic view of the potential for future development provided 
by their respective economic and political systems, both socialist realism and the “end 
of ideology” were seen by Mills at their root as “postures” opposed to radical 
criticism of society.147 While noting the obvious difference that socialist realism was 
an official, and enforced, government policy where as the “end of ideology” was a 
self-managed effort to build consensus, Mills’ connection of the “end of ideology” 
proponents to Soviet intellectuals working in the mold of socialist realism echoes the 
desire of the CIA for the CCF to act as a counter to Soviet front groups in the cultural 
and intellectual realm. By connecting “NATO intellectuals,” such as Schlesinger and 
Bell, to Soviet intellectuals, Mills’ demonstrated that while the Congress had failed in 
convincing a leading figure of the New Left that support for the “end of ideology” did 
not stem from conservative politics, it had succeeded in providing a prominent 
counterweight to Soviet front organizations. As the New Left came further to the fore 
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of the Western intellectual landscape, such achievements in opposing Soviet front 
groups would bring the Congress little praise while the inability to present a 
transatlantic intellectual consensus tied to the “end of ideology” as anything other 
than conservative further challenged the organization’s efforts in reaching out to a 
new generation of radical intellectuals.  
Drawing heavily from the work of Mills, Tom Hayden along with 
representatives from colleges and universities across the US gathered in Port Huron, 
Michigan in June of 1962 to draft the manifesto for what would come to be Students 
for a Democratic Society (SDS). In this manifesto, the Port Huron Statement, the 
influence of Mills became evident in the image of an American people isolated from 
the political process and an ardent critique of American institutions.148 While the Port 
Huron Statement highlighted many perceived failings of liberalism and the ills faced 
by American society, the manifesto was also intended as a call to arms that sought to 
provoke youth away from defeatism and apathy in an attempt to turn back the 
complacency of the postwar years. Providing a thoroughly different interpretation of 
the affluence and seemingly complete social, political and economic solutions that 
Bell and his colleagues viewed the postwar welfare state as providing, the Port Huron 
Statement authors emphasized the inadequacies of American liberalism to the face the 
challenges found in an affluent and seemingly successful postwar society.149  
While recognizing the development of an “end of ideology” in American 
society and politics, the authors of the Port Huron Statement clearly remained 
                                                
     148Rebecca Klatch, A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right and the 1960s (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), 26. 
     149 “The Port Huron Statement” in “Takin’ it to the Streets”: A Sixties Reader, eds. Alexander 
Bloom and Wini Breines (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 51-52. 
 60 
 
unconvinced by Bell’s insistence that an embrace of such developments did not stem 
from a reactionary form of politics. To the authors, consensus around a technocratic 
“end of ideology” as the ultimate development of American politics represented a 
deadening “national stalemate” with ambiguous and tradition bound goals at a time 
when the threat of nuclear war, racial inequality, poverty and other societal issues 
demanded a “revolutionary leadership.”150 Believing that the threat of nuclear war 
meant that theirs may be “the last generation in the experiment with living,” the 
authors of this manifesto rejected the notion put forward by Bell and his colleagues 
that the “temporary equilibriums of our society and world are eternally functioning 
parts.”151 With an intense feeling of urgency in light of the potentially catastrophic 
dangers of the postwar world, the authors viewed Bell’s belief in the “temporary 
equilibrium” of the mixed economy and welfare state as permanent solutions to be a 
primary cause of the pervasive notion in American politics that “there is no viable 
alternative to the present.”152  
Going further than simple opposition to Bell’s insistence that the “end of 
ideology” provided “room for utopian thinking,” contributors to the Port Huron 
Statement contended that the political philosophy also justified an exhaustion of any 
new direction for social change whatsoever. For the authors, this stultifying embrace 
of the status quo resulted not only from the purportedly total potential for social and 
political solutions provided by the mixed economy and welfare state but also from the 
ways the increasingly technocratic nature and complex structure of society had led the 
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American people to fear change itself.153 With a strident focus on the importance of 
values, the Port Huron Statement condemned the technocratic approach as 
insufficient in explaining implicit ideals. Sitting atop a core platform of participatory 
democracy, the Port Huron Statement rejected the existing political system, in which 
many decisions of fundamental social consequence were made by a small and insular 
group of technocrats. Instead, the manifesto proposed a participatory democracy in 
which fundamental questions of social policy would be deliberated in public 
groupings. In defense against “end of ideology” proponents and others who viewed 
such broad political deliberation in a complex industrial society as utopian fantasy, 
the authors contended that the technocratic approached had ‘“competently’ 
manipulated [the American people] into incompetence.”154 With a strong confidence 
in the potential competence of the common citizen, the authors saw little reason why 
the American people could not “meet with increasing skill the complexities and 
responsibilities of their situation, if society is organized not for minority, but for 
majority, participation in decision-making.”155 
Emphasizing the theme of alienation that would come to be a characteristic 
theme of the New Left, the authors of the Port Huron Statement contended that by 
playing an active role in the decision making process, the American people could 
hope to find the meaning and value in the democratic process missing from the 
technocratic approach to governance. They additionally contended that through active 
political participation the American people could escape from the debilitating fear of 
change perpetuated by a technocratic system they played little part in and had a 
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limited understanding of.156 Despite the material progress that had been achieved by a 
mixed economy and social welfare state in the postwar years, the Port Huron 
Statement presented the accompanying technocratic approach as offering no solutions 
to the pervasive problem of alienation in an advanced industrial society. With their 
strong support of participatory democracy and a desire to address problems of 
alienation, the authors of the Port Huron Statement came to see support for the “end 
of ideology” and technocracy as fundamentally opposed to their visions and could not 
see support for ideological exhaustion as anything other than a conservative embrace 
of existing political, social and economic conditions.  
Adding his voice to the vigorous opposition to the “end of ideology” 
expressed by   C. Wright Mill’s and the authors of the Port Huron Statement, German 
philosopher Herbet Marcuse critically viewed support for the “end of ideology” as a 
deadening and conservative embrace of present cirucmstances. In the 1960s, Marcuse 
rose to the unlikely role of expert on and teacher of the New Left with his critical 
analysis of advanced industrial society and rejection of the work of Bell, Galbraith, 
and other leading members of the Congress who espoused the positive contributions 
of the “end of ideology” and “the affluent society” to the postwar Western society. 
The most politicized of scholars affiliated with what later became known as “the 
Frankfurt School,” Marcuse introduced a youthful audience of budding radicals to his 
theories of how seemingly free democratic societies repressed individual’s sexual, 
psychological, and intellectual freedoms in his 1955 Eros and Civilization.157 
Building on these themes of subtle repression, Marcuse undertook a comprehensive 
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study of advanced industrial society in his 1964 One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the 
Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. The work sold widely on both sides of the 
Atlantic and provided a generation of young intellectuals and New Left activists with 
the tools of dialectical thought and theory-based practice. Responding to the 
enthusiastic response of young radicals and many of his academic colleagues, 
Marcuse became not only an ardent supporter of New Left movements but also a 
primary intellectual inspiration that influenced the anti-war movement, the 
counterculture, and many other emerging oppositional social movements.158  
In Eros and Civilization, published in 1955, Marcuse provided an optimistic 
and vivid depiction of his vision of liberation. Expressing a far more pessimistic tone 
in 1964, One-Dimensional Man saw Marcuse shift his focus to a systematic analysis 
of the forces dominating society. In his exploration of how democratic society 
developed new forms of social control that were producing a “one-dimensional man” 
and a “society without opposition,” Marcuse looked to the “end of ideology” in the 
American political landscape as a primary factor in the move towards conformity. For 
Marcuse, the integration of the working class into the capitalist system described in 
the “end of ideology” and the pervasive influence on culture and society by a mass 
media that perpetuated artificial consumer needs had led to a system that encouraged 
conformity of thought and stifled challenges to the status quo.159 While agreeing with 
Bell on the reality on the postwar material prosperity and subsequent de-
radicalization experienced by the working class, Marcuse differed markedly in this 
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interpretation of what these developments meant. Bell saw the “end of ideology” 
developed by the ascendency of the mixed economy and welfare state as a positive 
development in American politics resulting in a progressive and adaptable system 
that, with the aid of technocrats, could meet the ever changing needs of society. 
Marcuse viewed these developments as providing the means for repression that while 
far subtler than the totalitarian methods of the Soviet Union were equally as pervasive 
and effective. In contrast to Bell’s satisfaction with the progressive possibilities he 
saw the postwar American political-economy as providing, Marcuse’s writing sought 
to oppose this “one-dimensional society” with critical and dialectical thinking that 
advocated a “great refusal” of all of the subtle modes of repression and domination.160 
In the One-Dimensional Man’s provocative thesis that the prosperity and 
apparent freedoms of the US and other advanced industrial societies in the postwar 
period were in fact unfreedoms, Marcuse advanced an interpretation of the “end of 
ideology” that viewed Bell’s position as not only but also repressive. Marcuse viewed 
support for the “end of ideology” as reactionary in the way in which it created a 
technical process seeking to contain all social change and defeat or refute those 
challenges that could not be incorporated into the existing system.161 In addition to 
rejecting Bell’s insistence that the “end of ideology” represented a progressive 
development in American politics, Marcuse went further in contending that the “end 
of ideology” had contributed to an irrational and repressive society that squandered 
the tremendous potential offered by a developed industrial infrastructure. While 
noting the difference between modern subtle forms of repression and earlier overt 
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forms resting on the use of terror, Marcuse contended that as the intellectual and 
material capabilities of society increased so too did the scope of society’s repression 
of the individual. Marcuse found the distinction between earlier and modern forms of 
repression in the way by which the postwar US saw social opposition conquered by 
technocracy and rising material prosperity rather than the use of terror and or 
violence.162  
In response to Marcuse’s insistence that support for the “end of ideology” 
represented an embrace of not only reactionary but also repressive politics, the 
Congress engaged in protracted criticism of the German philosopher’s work and 
political activity. Providing the most comprehensive of the CCF’s critiques of 
Marcuse’s work, Maurice Cranston’s article in the March 1969 issue of Encounter 
sought to portray Marcuse’s positions and political direction as essentially illiberal. In 
particular, Cranston pointed to the illiberal nature of the influential New Left figure’s 
political philosophies by drawing attention to his promotion of violence as a viable 
means for minority groups to exert influence on the structure of society.163 He 
emphasized, and categorically rejected, Marcuse’s distinction of permissible 
“revolutionary violence” in opposition to an oppressive system and the existing 
“reactionary violence” practiced by the institutions of the state. In brining the issue of 
violence to the forefront of his analysis of Marcuse’s work, Cranston depicted 
Marcuse as decidedly outside of the transnational consensus around “vital center” 
liberalism embraced by Encounter and the Congress. Seemingly unable to view 
Marcuse except in the political categories of the Old Left, Cranston emphasized 
                                                
     162 Ibid., ix-x.  
     163 Maurice Cranston, “Herbert Marcuse,” Encounter 32, no. 3 (1969): 38. 
 66 
 
Marcuse’s desire to see to fruition his vision of a freer society by “apparently 
undemocratic means” as essentially a misguided imitation of Lenin’s “dictatorship of 
the proletariat”.164 Unsure of which side of the totalitarian spectrum to place Marcuse 
in, Cranston additionally criticized the German philosopher’s opposition to liberalism 
and described him as a practitioner of “German totalitarian fanaticism” in the mold of 
“Fichte, Marx, Bismarck, [and] Hitler.”165 
Widely read by a young generation of Western intellectuals looking for 
alternatives to “vital center” liberalism and the seemingly complete solutions 
provided by Bell’s “end of ideology,” Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man challenged 
the CCF’s ability to resonate with this increasingly radical generation. Marcuse’s 
insistence on support for ideological exhaustion as both reactionary and repressive 
convinced many among a generation of intellectuals beginning their careers that the 
“end of ideology” celebrated by the Congress held little potential for significant social 
change and had little relevance in the context of the radicalism and turbulence taking 
place in the 1960s. For the CCF’s part in its relationship with the New Left, the 
organization’s inability and unwillingness to view and depict Marcuse as anything 
other than a fanatical revolutionary who advocated violence did little to attract the 
interest and support of an emerging generation of intellectuals more familiar with 
Marcuse than the often antiquated figures of the liberal “vital center” who comprised 
the Congress and wrote for its magazines.  
Beyond simply alienating a new generation of radical intellectuals, the dismay 
of leading members of the Congress towards the perceived violence and illiberal 
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positions of Marcuse and the New Left led a number of leading figures in the 
organization to drift towards neoconservatism  in their belief that they had been at 
least partially responsible for the rise of postwar radicalism. For these members of the 
Congress, particularly those from the New York Intellectuals, the political and social 
reforms they had helped to develop and promote in the 1960s had failed to deliver on 
their lofty promises and inspired a generation of young radicals to seek alternative, 
often illiberal, solutions to the issues raised.166 Sociologist and Kennedy 
administration appointee Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s blunt pronouncement that quite 
simply “the government did not know what it was doing” resonated with those the 
New York Intellectuals and other members of the Congress who believed that the 
roots of liberalism’s failures and the rise of a destructive New Left rested on the 
flawed or incomplete theories upon which liberal programs had been based.167 
Echoing Moynihan in responding to the New Left’s roots in the Civil Rights 
Movement, Irving Kristol made the observation in 1968 that “we have discovered in 
these past years that it just doesn’t suffice to pass a law in order to solve minorities’ 
problems.” Further distancing himself from “vital center” liberalism’s orientation 
towards large-scale government programs to address social issues, he added that,  
“somehow the money never seems to reach the people for whom it is intended—or, if 
it does, it never has the effect it was supposed to have.”168  
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Owing to their belief in the role they had played in the failures of “vital 
center” liberalism and subsequent rise of destructive radicalism, Kristol and his 
fellow New York Intellectuals in the Congress began to fear for the survival of 
traditional institutions and their own rather prominent positions in them. Viewing 
“vital center” liberalism as both partially responsible for and too weak to quell the 
tide of New Left radicalism, the New York Intellectuals saw that basis of American 
society as being placed under tremendous risk because, according to Kristol, the 
failures of liberalism and the resulting surge of radical attacks had resulted in the 
essential institutions of society “being inexorably drained of their legitimacy.”169 
When New Left radicalism came to a striking flashpoint with the student rebellion 
and occupation of Columbia University in April 1968, Kristol, along with Nathan 
Glazer, Daniel Bell, and other members of the Congress associated with the New 
York Intellectuals appeared increasingly reactionary in their desperate attempts to 
defend the institutions from which their prominent social positions emanated. Glazer, 
who resided in New York at the time of the Columbia occupation and had been a 
professor at the University of California Berkeley when protests first began there in 
1964, later reflected, “Anyone who has experienced the concrete situation in 
American universities know that the threats to free speech, free teaching, free 
research, come from radical white students, from militant black students, and from 
their faculty defenders.”170 In his preference for suppressing the free speech of 
student radicals in order to maintain the seemingly more important freedoms he 
perceived as under grave threat at the University, Glazer paradoxically moved away 
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from liberalism and towards conservatism in a concerted effort to protect traditional 
liberal values he saw as greatly endangered.  
With many of the initial founders and influential figures of the organization in 
its ranks, the New York Intellectuals represented the most prominent element of the 
American contingent in the Congress. When a number of the New York Intellectuals 
embraced conservative positions in defense of liberal values they perceived as under 
threat, maintenance of a transatlantic intellectual consensus around “vital center” 
liberalism as a necessary guardian of the Western cultural-intellectual tradition 
became tremendously difficult. During the course of the New York Intellectuals 
journey from the socially marginal years of their youth spent debating the merits of 
Trotskyism over Stalinism at City College cafeterias to positions of power in 
institutions such as Columbia University and the CCF, they ceased to be an 
intellectual vanguard and became instead an intellectual institution.171 Relinquishing 
traditional ideals of the free-floating intellectual as a detached critic of society and 
instead drawing prominence and influence from the institutions to which they had 
become increasingly tethered, the New York Intellectuals came to view conservative 
politics as necessary for protecting their cherished liberal institutions. As the New 
York Intellectuals moved further rightward in reaction to New Left challenges, the 
increasingly young radicals who already critically viewed the Congress and the “end 
of ideology” as conservative in nature became even more uninterested in support of 
or cooperation with the organization. More importantly, the rightward turn of the 
New York Intellectuals towards neoconservatism  led to difficulties in cooperation 
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with the generally more left-leaning European members of the Congress and 
contributed to something of a Euro-American schism in the organization.  
Proving the exception to the rule of the rightward drift of the New York 
Intellectuals, Dwight Macdonald’s bolstered his maverick reputation when he 
responded to the New Left by moving to the left of the “vital center.” Having had his 
1958 article “America! America!” rejected by Encounter’s editors on the grounds that 
it was overly anti-American and losing out on succeeding Irving Kristol as Encounter 
co-editor because Michael Josselson believed he was too “lone wolf” for the journal, 
Macdonald had long experienced a precarious but vital position in the Congress.172 
Despite such questions as to his “political reliability”, Macdonald’s international 
prominence and well-known independent streak proved invaluable to the CCF’s 
efforts in establishing its credentials as an authentic cultural-intellectual organization 
and in reaching out to Western, particularly European, intellectuals wary of uncritical 
endorsements of the U.S. Though Macdonald had been able to join the “middle 
ground” of transatlantic consensus around “vital center” liberalism with figures such 
as Kristol, Glazer, and Bell in the 1950s, the emergence of New Left radicalism 
brought to light differences that had been swept under the surface in the perceived 
urgency of establishing such a workable consensus during the early postwar years. 
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When his fellow New York Intellectuals adopted conservative political positions and 
closed ranks in protection around the institutions in which they had achieved 
prominent positions, Macdonald, though not uncritically, sympathized with New Left 
activists and supported their efforts to challenge institutional authority and shake the 
country out of the political apathy he saw the “end of ideology” as encouraging.173  
In the political parting that splintered the transatlantic intellectual consensus 
of the Congress, both Macdonald and his fellow New York Intellectuals stressed their 
perceptions of the failures of “vital center” liberalism in addressing the urgent issues 
of the 1960s. While his fellow New York Intellectuals moved rightward with the 
conviction that “vital center” liberalism could no longer protect the liberal values they 
saw as threatened by New Left radicalism, Macdonald drifted leftward in opposition 
to “vital center” liberalism he increasingly identified with the failings of President 
Johnson and towards a greater enthusiasm for anarcho-pacifism.174 Contrary to Glazer 
and other New York Intellectuals who maintained the necessity of conservative and 
vigorous opposition to student activists in order to protect the cherished liberal ideals 
of the academy, Macdonald remained critical of university administrations’ 
pretentions and insensitivity towards student interests.175 Though he remained critical 
of the romanticism displayed towards Third World Revolution in the student 
movement, he largely endorsed their use of civil disobedience and organized 
resistance as a viable and laudable means to advance Civil Rights and oppose the 
Vietnam War. With his anaracho-pacificst positions putting him in direct opposition 
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to the aggressive foreign policy of the “vital center” and his endorsement of the New 
Left earning him the contempt of fellow Congress members such as Irving Kristol 
and Edward Shils, Macdonald grew increasingly estranged with the organization in 
which he had long played a vital role.176 Though he would continue to play a 
periphery role in the organization, Macdonald, unlike a great many of his fellow 
members, did not rush to defend the mission of the Congress in the wake of 
revelations concerning its CIA funding. His disillusionment with “vital center” 
liberalism and the mission of the Congress manifested itself when he wrote to Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. in the aftermath of funding revelations in 1967 that “there isn’t any 
moral imperative I can see…that the Congress, or its off-shoots like Encounter, 
should continue to exist.”177 
Whether abandoned to the right by the neo-conservative turn of Bell, Glazer, 
Kristol and other Congress members from the New York Intellectuals or to the left by 
the anarcho-pacifist turn of Dwight Macdonald, the emergence of the New Left 
marked the beginning of the end period in which a broad consensus of Western 
intellectuals could be brought together under the broad umbrella of “vital center” 
liberalism. When most members of the New York Intellectuals felt the need to adopt 
conservative means to protect liberal values and Dwight Macdonald moved away 
from “vital center’ liberalism towards increasingly anarchist and pacifist positions, 
general agreement and consensus on liberalism ceased to be possible. The rise of the 
New Left brought to light the markedly different interpretations of liberalism held by 
members of the Congress that had been swept under the surface in the early postwar 
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years when the urgency of opposing communism had taken precedence over such 
divergences. With the Congress unable to reach out to a generation of intellectuals 
imbued by the New Left Movement and facing defections to the right and to the left 
by vital members from the New York Intellectuals, the “middle ground” of 
transatlantic intellectual consensus around “vital center” liberalism as a necessary 
guardian of the Western cultural intellectual tradition that had proven successful for 
the Congress in the 1950s began to unravel in the 1960s. When the Civil Rights 
Movement moved from the liberal and reform minded activism of Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. to the militant demands of Black Power, the strains placed on the CCF’s 










The Radicalization of the Civil Rights Movement, the Failures of 
“Vital Center” Liberalism, and the Neoconservative Turn  
 
As writers and activists of the New Left came to view support for the “end of 
ideology” in conservative terms and stressed limitations in the broader accompanying 
political philosophy of “vital center” liberalism, an increasingly radicalized Civil 
Rights movement leveled similar charges against the liberalism upon which the 
foundation of the Congress rested. Viewed by New Leftists as a conservative embrace 
of the status quo, “vital center” liberalism appeared to an increasing number of 
African Americans as woefully incapable of addressing the fundamental socio-
economic issues underlying racial inequality in the US. Like the New Left, the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1960s moved from origins rooted in liberal hope to 
disillusionment driven by radical politics.178 However, unlike the largely white 
proponents of the New Left, the increasingly militant black protesters who emerged 
in the wake of the Civil Rights movement never doubted that they were outcasts in 
mainstream American society. When liberal achievements in establishing greater 
racial equality fell short of expectations, an embittered and dynamic minority of 
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African Americans abandoned the goals of Civil Rights in favor of black nationalism. 
This increasing tendency towards racial separatism manifested itself by the mid-
1960s in both the ideology of Black Power and, less directly, in the ghetto riots taking 
place in urban areas across the country.179  
While the Congress supported Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s approach of non-
violence, racial integration, and his insistence on the potential for the liberal programs 
of the federal government to bring about necessary reform, the emergence of Bob 
Moses and Stokely Carmichael with their disdain of potential liberal allies, support of 
Black Power, black nationalism, and solidarity with Third World revolutionary 
struggles significantly challenged “vital center” liberalism as a viable platform for 
Civil Rights progress. Though the Congress did not categorically refrain from 
expressing dissatisfaction with the plight of African Americans in the US, it had 
always discussed failings within the context of the potential for “vital center” 
liberalism to solve the essential issues at hand. With the emergence of Black Power 
and black nationalism signaling both the dire situation of many African Americans in 
the US and the failures of liberal approaches to solving issues of racial equality, the 
Congress found the Civil Rights movement as less of an asset and more of a liability.  
For Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol, and other leading members of 
the Congress largely associated with the New York Intellectuals, the emergence of 
Black Power and ghetto riots demonstrated the limitations of a Civil Rights 
Movement rooted in liberalism, legislative reform, and large-scale government 
programs. Noting the failures and heightened expectations brought about by 
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government programs they had supported in the 1950s and early 1960s, these leading 
figures became convinced of their responsibility and the contributions of “vital 
center” liberalism in leading to the radicalization of the Civil Rights movement. As 
they came to view liberalism of the “vital center” as a fundamental factor in the 
emergence of black militancy, this prominent cohort in the Congress further 
gravitated toward the neoconservative politics they had begun to embrace in response 
to New Left radicalism. When these leading figures in the American contingent of the 
Congress abandoned “vital center” liberalism in favor of neoconservatism, it became 
virtually impossible for the Congress to maintain a “middle ground” in light of the 
strikingly different interpretations of liberalism adhered to by its members.180  
While the New York Intellectuals, including the outlying Dwight Macdonald, 
and European democratic socialists such as Ignazio Silone and Bertrand Russell had 
been able to join together under the seemingly broad political umbrella of “vital 
center” liberalism in the perceived urgency of the 1950s, first the emergence of the 
New Left and then the radicalization of the Civil Rights movements made such a 
grouping unworkable. As the radicalization of the Civil Rights movement further 
cemented the New York Intellectuals’ abandonment of “vital center” liberalism, the 
CCF’s transatlantic intellectual consensus around this political philosophy as the 
foundation for the continued prosperity of the Western cultural-intellectual tradition 
became increasingly untenable. The Euro-American parting in the Congress that had 
begun with the New York Intellectuals drift to neoconservatism in response to the 
New Left became an irreconcilable schism in the wake of the radicalization of the 
Civil Rights Movement.  
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 In many ways, the radicalization of the Civil Rights Movement followed the 
narrative of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)181 Formed in 
the Spring of 1960 to coordinate the scattered efforts of leaders in the sit-in 
movement, SNCC’s original members thoroughly espoused traditional liberal 
values.182 Mostly comprised of students from southern black colleges, SNCC’s 
members embraced non-violence, racial integration, a positive view of the federal 
government’s ability to further racial equality and a desire to gain acceptance in the 
American middle-class. Espousal of racial integration and non-violence as essential 
philosophies came under questioning after the SNCC’s efforts to register black voters 
in Mississippi in 1961 led many members to the radical conviction that a nation 
which tolerated Mississippi’s poverty and racism had to be fundamentally flawed. By 
1964, substantial numbers of black SNCC members expressed resentment towards the 
growing proportion of white members in the organization and the disproportionate 
number of whites in positions of leadership.183  
After the foremost symbol of “vital center” liberalism, President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, opposed the seating of the Mississippi Freedom Democracy Party, created to 
thwart the system of the white-only primary, SNCC changed its goal from Civil 
Rights to “liberation.”184 Along with an abandonment of racial integration, alliance 
with white liberals, and non-violence, SNCC’s leadership increasingly came to liken 
the struggle of African Americans in the US with the colonial and revolutionary 
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struggles of the Third World. At an anti-war teach-in at Berkley in 1965, SNCC field 
secretary Bob Moses declared himself to be “a member of the Third World” in an 
analysis that linked the plight of Vietnamese peasants to that of African Americans in 
Mississippi. By likening the struggle for racial justice to the US government’s efforts 
to put down “liberation movements” in the Third World, SNCC became the first civil 
rights organization to speak out against the war when it issued a statement in support 
of draft resistance in January 1966.185 SNCC president Stokely Carmichael further 
developed the organization’s linkage of the US struggle for racial justice and the 
revolutionary struggles of the Third World when he embraced the work of Frantz 
Fanon and stressed instead of négritude the common struggle of the colored people of 
the world against white capitalist imperialism. Amid a backdrop of ghetto riots in the 
summer of 1967, Carmichael stressed anti-imperialism as an essential mission for 
SNCC when he affirmed the solidarity of African Americans with the oppressed 
peoples of the world and declared willingness to enlist in the global struggle against 
white imperialism.186  
A pivotal turn in the relationship of liberals to the Civil Rights movement 
occurred when Stokely Carmichael, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. of the Southern 
Christian Leadership (SCLC), and Floyd McKissick of the Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE) flew to Mississippi to continue James Meredith’s March Against 
Fear. As white hostility towards the March increased and Carmichael, King, and 
McKissick failed to agree on how to respond to violence, marchers responded in kind 
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to the violent provocations of local whites.187 In the aftermath, Carmichael became 
the spokesperson for the March when he issued the cry of “black power” that would 
bring him national attention. The New York Times reported that when Carmichael 
shouted “We want black power!,” “each time the younger members of the audience 
shouted back, ‘black power!’”188 Expressing his disapproval of the slogan, King 
called on the crowds to raise their voices for “freedom now” instead of “black 
power.” Despite King’s efforts, by the end of rally the new cry of “black power” had 
drowned out the insistence on “freedom now.”189  
While the Congress had given greater attention to the Civil Rights Movement 
when it called for “freedom now” than when it demanded “black power,” the 
organization and its journals had long given conspicuously meager attention to the 
topic. When compared with the coverage devoted to the Civil Rights Movement in 
competing American and European cultural-intellectual journals and the broader 
media of the West, the limited extent of coverage found in Encounter and other 
Congress publications is made particularly evident. While the Congress did not 
categorically refrain from highlighting the plight of African Americans in the US, its 
published coverage featured both a careful selection of authors and a general 
emphasis on the promise for reform provided by “vital center” liberalism. From the 
beginning of its existence, the Congress largely steered clear of writers from the 
American South who Sidney Hook had complained of in 1949 as reinforcing negative 
stereotypes of the US with their “novels of social protest and revolt” and “American 
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degeneracy and inanity.”190 The Congress did not act alone during this period in its 
disavowal of Southern writers, finding a similar disavowal undertaken by a variety of 
Cold Warriors from both the public and private spheres. Motion Picture Association 
of America (MPAA) President Eric Johnston led the assault on Southern writers and 
artists, remarking, “We’ll have no more Grapes of Wrath, we’ll have no more 
Tobacco Roads. We’ll have no more films that show the steamy side of American 
life.”191 The position of public and private media leaders towards Southern writers 
influenced the reading habits of American citizens as sales of books by Erskine 
Caldwell, William Faulkner, John Steinbeck, and Richard Wright declined during the 
early 1950s.192  
In its limited attention to the plight of race relations in the South and the 
broader Civil Rights movement, Encounter and other Congress journals carefully 
selected the writers who were to cover the subject. More often than not, the journals 
published by the Congress eschewed coverage of the Civil Rights Movement in favor 
of coverage of and involvement in the process of de-colonization and emergence of 
independent states in Africa. Though the vast majority of the members of the CCF 
were from Western Europe or the US and the organization’s foremost interest focused 
on the maintenance of cultural freedom in Europe, the Congress had been from its 
creation, an international organization with national associations across the globe. As 
the disappearance of a monolithic Stalinist threat and the emergence of détente 
diminished the urgency of protecting cultural freedom in Europe, members of the 
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Congress, both Western and non-Western, gave greater attention to the issues of 
cultural freedom in the decolonizing and rapidly changing Third World. The shift of 
the Congress towards the Third Word followed the establishment of a détente with 
communism in Europe that coincided with a significantly more aggressive policy in 
the rest of the world on the part of both the West and the Soviet Union. Historian 
Christopher Lasch, who associated with the New Left Movement during the period in 
which he wrote on the Congress, argued that while European détenete had made the 
anti-communist rhetoric of the fifties obsolete it had not diminished the broader 
necessity of anti-communism. The Congress poured greater energy into its non-
European activities in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the anti-communist efforts of 
Western governments and politicians also came to place further focus on the Third 
World.193  
When the Congress established national associations and initiated activities in 
Africa during the late 1950s, the continent became the last major region in which the 
organization developed a program. Prior to the 1955 “Future of Freedom Conference” 
in Milan the CCF’s membership and international seminars failed to feature any 
Africans. Held in the same year as the pivotal Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, 
Indonesia, the Milan conference featured Michael Polanyi who spoke for the 
Congress when he acknowledged the “proud peoples of the ancient lands who are 
now coming into their own” in Africa and Asia who had made him aware of “the 
exhilarating perspective…of this immense area of new companionship.”194  Amid the 
1956 World Conference of African Writers, the independence of Ghana in 1957, and 
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French African colonies in 1958, the Congress developed a tentative African Program 
in the months prior to the 1960 “African Independence Year,” in which seventeen 
new African States gained admittance to the United Nations. 
Despite the energy poured by the Congress into initiatives in Africa, the 1960s 
would see the organization’s African programs collapse amid rampant political 
repression. The Institute of Congolese Studies in Brazzaville became the first in a 
series of Congress casualties in Africa in which virtually all of the organization’s 
African operations faced elimination by the end of the 1960s.195 While the CCF’s 
African program ended in stunning failure, the organization suffered minimal lasting 
consequences as such failures, unlike those associated with the New Left and black 
militancy, were not tied to a failure of “vital center” liberalism but rather the general 
absence of liberal politics. As the credibility of the Congress with Western 
intellectuals did not intrinsically rely on outcomes in Africa, the failure of what many 
in the CCF viewed as a program of secondary importance compared to issues 
pertaining directly to the West passed with relatively little attention from intellectuals 
both within and outside the organization. While the Congress had given relatively 
extensive attention to African issues in Encounter, such attention came as a result of 
the organization’s ability to cover glaring issues with a detachment and lack of 
accountability that would have been impossible in coverage of the Civil Rights 
Movement in the US.  
Unable to approach Civil Rights issues with the detachment and free hand 
seen in its coverage of African issues, Encounter’s coverage of the Civil Rights 
Movement remained both highly selective and limited. Though featuring far more 
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articles on the Civil Rights Movement in its earlier years, Encounter failed even 
during this period to provide significant coverage of major milestones in the 
Movement such as Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 or the Voting Rights Act of 1965. For a publication that so often immersed itself 
in U.S. issues, the relative inattention to Civil Rights belied an uneasiness of 
Encounter and the Congress with the gulf between the theory and practice of 
democracy and race relations that often came to the fore during the Civil Rights 
Movement. Such uneasiness would only be exacerbated when the limitations of a 
Civil Rights Movement rooted in liberalism became increasingly exposed in the latter 
half of the 1960s.  
Providing one of the most extensive assessments on the U.S. Civil Rights 
Movement to be found in Encounter’s limited coverage, Richard Rovere’s August 
1963 article, “Negro Crisis: Letter from the American Kitchen,” both painted a rosy 
picture of progress achieved and warned of future potential dangers.196 Rovere’s 
article began with a juxtaposition of quotes from Malcom X and James Baldwin, with 
the latter endorsed by Rovere for having been a critic of American culture who 
became one of its heroes and in doing so provided a vision of race relations that could 
be embraced by both blacks and whites. In championing a literary figure over a more 
overtly political figure, Rovere traversed difficult political territory by taking a more 
cultural route.197 With his general acceptance as essentially a cultural figure, Baldwin 
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received support from institutions of American liberalism that would have been far 
less likely to endorse similarly critical views of a more overtly political critic. In his 
proclamation that “people of all sorts are telling one another how very right Baldwin 
is, how beautifully he puts things, and how thoroughly justified he is in saying what 
he says,” Rovere pointed to ringing endorsements from mainstream publications such 
as Life, Newsweek, the New York Times, and Time.198  
Of the various institutions of American liberalism endorsing Baldwin, Rovere 
considered the U.S. Attorney General’s assessment of Baldwin’s work as “terrific” to 
be the most significant. The Attorney General’s support for Baldwin struck Rovere as 
“a bit as if one of the Romanovs had said, circa 1915, that he got quite a kick out of 
reading Leon Trotsky.”199 For Rovere, the Attorney General’s support for a 
seemingly critical and dissident figure gained further illumination when placed in 
stark contrast to the obvious rigidity of the Tsarist regime in Russia. With his ability 
to endorse and accommodate dissident views into a program of change, the U.S. 
Attorney General received praise from Rovere because as a significant representative 
of “vital center” liberalism his comments supported the notion of this political 
philosophy as an enduring engine of progressive change.  
While Rovere did not shy from criticism of US Civil Rights progress with his 
support for Baldwin’s critical positions and a skeptical view of Kennedy’s actions in 
light of promising rhetoric, on the whole, he depicted the circumstances and promises 
of the Movement in a strikingly positive manner. Though he conceded the potential 
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for the extremes of white supremacy and black militarism to derail progress, Rovere 
asserted that in his opinion “it’s going to work out in some other way.”200 Appearing 
to be on the defensive, Rovere asked his readers if it was possible to not sound 
“crackers” when he made the statement “that I am at this moment—mid-June 1963—
quite proud of my countrymen.”201 In his assessment of the significant progress that 
occurred in the lives of African Americans, he took mobs of thirty years past who 
“were hanging, shooting, and beating Negroes to death at the rate of one every three 
weeks” as his starting point.202 While conceding that simply stopping the mass 
murder of African Americans did not amount to the greatest of success stories, he 
pointed out that a generation ago the entire civil rights program of a “great liberal 
president” had been a federal anti-lynching bill that never passed.203  
From a starting point of mass lynching, Rovere celebrated the achievements 
gained through the mature and resourceful leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and his colleagues.204 In his celebration of Civil Rights progress, Rovere displayed a 
rather selective memory of race relations in the South during the 1960s. In describing 
the progress achieved since the mass lynching of thirty years past, he contended that 
while the white South resisted the direct action of African Americans it had not 
confronted non-violence with violence. Failing to take into account the bombings of 
African American churches and the homes of Civil Rights activists as well as the 
decreased but nonetheless continued practice of lynching, Rovere contended that 
white Southerners did not refrain from violent reaction because they feared black 
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militants. Rather, he asserted, they have “come to know something of guilt” and 
feared “the rest of the country and, in particular, the federal power.”205 For Rovere, 
national consensus around “vital center” liberalism, channeled through the power of 
the federal government, had not only secured further legal rights for African 
Americans but had also acted as a moral and physical deterrent to whites in the South 
who would have otherwise engaged in violent responses to African American efforts 
to gain civil rights. Sadly, such factors did not deter the Klu Klux Klan members who 
one month after the publication of Rovere’s article bombed the 16th Street Baptist 
Church in Birmingham, Alabama, killing four African American girls. 
 For Rovere, the existing gains of the Civil Rights Movement by mid-1963 
through the efforts of effective African American leadership aligned with the 
consensus of millions of white Americans “who have now been aroused by the shame 
of segregation as they have been aroused by nothing else in their lives,” trumped the 
potential for the Movement to take a radical and violent turn.206 Rovere noted the 
advice of James Baldwin and “a great many others” that the moderate and liberal 
leadership of Martin Luther King Jr. and his associates could fall out of favor with the 
rank and file of the Movement and become replaced by radical leaders who espoused 
violence. Though he acknowledged such a possibility, Rovere proceeded to boast, 
“we would still have a record of famous victories by Dr. King and his admirable field 
captains.”207 Even the distinct possibility of a violent direction for the Civil Rights 
movement, which would have presumably demonstrated the limitations of King’s 
moderate leadership and progress achieved through liberal politics, did not dim 
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Rovere’s celebration of the “splendid hour, with many heroes” he saw as then at 
hand.208   
As the moderate leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr. became increasingly 
displaced in media coverage of the Movement by more radical and militant elements 
in the mid-1960s, Marcus Cunliffe wrote the first piece for Encounter to specifically 
assess black nationalism and the emerging prominence of the Nation of Islam. 
Appearing in the July 1964 issue of Encounter Cunliffe’s “Black Muslims, White 
Liberals” emphasized the overrepresentation of extreme elements in media coverage 
of the Civil Rights Movement and warned of the potential for bloodshed but ended on 
a cautiously optimistic note.209 Though acknowledging that African Americans were 
justified in their anger at the American legal system’s slowness in executing law into 
practice and the various socio-economic inequalities that continued to persist, 
Cunliffe stridently criticized the Nation of Islam’s total repudiation of white Christian 
culture as essentially a reversal of white supremacy. Citing a relatively long history of 
African American contempt for white culture, Cunliffe contended that “Muslim 
propaganda” became represented as a new and revolutionary rhetoric simply because 
it had become “the only tone possible if one seeks yet again to restate the Negro case 
without inducing a yawn in listeners.”210 He viewed this “dull stalemate” as 
encouraging the extremes of white supremacy and black militancy and maintained 
that only such extremes could compel someone “to finish a newspaper story.”211  
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For Cunliffe, the media’s framing of Civil Rights discussion around figures 
such as Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X contributed to the popular sense of a 
“revolutionary situation” in which moderates and liberals were made to appear 
“foolish” and sometimes “treacherous.”212 He contended that in these circumstances, 
valuable African American leaders such as James Baldwin, Ralph Bunche, John Hope 
Franklin, and Carl Rowan faced difficulty in projecting their more moderate positions 
in between the extremes that had come to dictate the terms of debate. Noting that the 
nature of this debate resulted in moderate African American leaders running the risk 
of being regarded as “hostages held by whites,” Cunliffe added that the media’s 
polarization had also made it difficult for white liberals to ally themselves with a 
movement increasingly seen as being dominated by black militants who categorically 
rejected their support. Cunliffe asserted that the most vital and overlooked aspect of 
such a rejection could be found in the way that white liberals clearly wanted to be on 
the side of African Americans. He cited the millions of young white students, along 
with university faculty and other traditionally liberal elements of society, who were 
actively interested in the betterment of African American life as evidence of the 
potential for widespread support of African American efforts to gain civil rights.213 
The foremost culprit in thwarting further alliance between interested white Americans 
and African American activists, Cunliffe contended, could be found not among the 
relatively small number of black militants or the masses of white liberals, but rather 
in a media establishment guilty of polarizing the debate in order to run sensational 
headlines.  
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While the early militancy of the Nation of Islam, and even the liberal phase of 
the Civil Rights movement lead by Martin Luther King Jr., presented the Congress 
with difficult circumstances that often found the organization looking for scapegoats, 
the increasing prominence of Black Power and the pervasiveness of riots in African 
American ghettos across the country during the late 1960s provided an 
insurmountable challenge to the “vital center” liberalism espoused by the 
organization. Featuring limited coverage of the Civil Rights Movement throughout its 
history, the number of articles on the Movement and broader issues of African 
American life found in Encounter perceptibly declined in the latter half of the 1960s. 
With African Americans having gained extensive legal rights on paper while SNCC 
decidedly abandoned their commitment to non-violence, the Black Panthers touted 
guns in front of the cameras of the national media, and urban areas across the country 
stood in shambles after series of riots, the direction the Civil Rights movement had 
taken presented far more challenges than promise for the CCF’s efforts to showcase 
the social advances achieved through liberalism of the “vital center”. As the failure of 
the “vital center” liberalism’s ability to address such developments became 
increasingly apparent, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol and other members 
of the Congress largely associated with the New York Intellectuals conceded such 
defects and fundamentally abandoned this form of liberalism in favor of 
neoconservatism.  
Writing one the few pieces for Encounter to address the emergence of Black 
Power and the prevalence of ghetto riots, Nathan Glazer’s November 1967 article, 
“The Ghetto Crisis,” expressed confusion and uneasiness with the politics of “vital 
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center” liberalism and singled the beginning of his turn to neoconservatism. Written 
during a period of transition from “vital center” liberalism to neoconservatism, Glazer 
provided an assessment of the Civil Rights Movement comprised of equal parts 
willful optimism and nostalgic desire for a return to the simpler circumstances of the 
past.214 Like Cunliffe, he contended that the influence of radical elements in African 
American communities extended beyond their relatively small size. Whatever the size 
of the radical element, Glazer maintained that they had decidedly seized the political 
initiative of the movement in no small part thanks to their increased access to 
television cameras. However, unlike Cunliffe, he did not single out the impact of 
media magnification as the primary culprit of exaggerating the presence of radical 
elements and instead spread the blame among the “more substantial social forces 
[that] have been interwoven with the vagaries of politics and the nature of the mass 
media to lead to the domination of the extremists.”215 No longer resorting to a lone 
scapegoat in the form of the national media, Glazer directly confronted the issue of 
extremism as an internal development within African American communities as a 
response to the failures of liberal government programs.   
In the development of extreme positions and radical organizations, Glazer 
pointed to the general position of the bulk of the African Americans who no longer 
accepted a distribution of political power and wealth, which provided them with less 
income, less job security, inferior housing, and greater police brutality. Tracing 
violent radicalization to an origin in violent rhetoric, he contended that the increasing 
prevalence of such an uncompromising position had led to a “violent language” in 
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which housing projects were designated “prisons,” poverty was called “slavery,” 
disrespectful language became “brutality,” and the demand for better living 
conditions came to be expressed as a cry for “liberation” or “freedom.”216 The turn of 
rhetoric towards a violent direction represented a crucial development for Glazer as 
he believed that people were far more likely to take extreme action for “liberation” 
and “freedom” than they would “for higher welfare payments.”217  
Writing on the national response to ghetto riots, Glazer provided both a muted 
celebration of the calm and mature reaction of the Johnson Administration and a 
strikingly optimistic view of the future, which depended largely on his “faith” in the 
U.S. to adapt to change rather than any evidence provided in his article. Glazer noted 
that rather than the wave of repressive responses in the wake of riots in Newark and 
Detroit that one might have expected, the majority of actions undertaken or proposed 
by the Johnson Administration to increase security had been “liberal and 
reasonable.”218 Not simply seeking a demand for suppression of illegal acts, Glazer 
described the President’s Commission on the riots as emphasizing the poor 
performance of inadequately trained National Guard members and a need to address 
the underlying socio-economic inequality faced by urban African Americans. In 
addition to the “liberal response” of the Johnson Administration, Glazer found 
encouragement from transformations in national consensus in which the majority of 
white Americans no longer accepted the unequal socio-economic conditions faced by 
African Americans and favored “massive aid for the Ghetto.”219 
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Despite his seeming satisfaction of public support for aid to ghettos, Glazer 
paradoxically critiqued such programs with a litany of disclaimers on their limitations 
and unlikeliness to gain political support while simultaneously presenting them as the 
only viable option to improve conditions in the ghetto. Though finding significant 
faults in potential programs such as a Works Progress Administration style program, 
public housing, “negative” income tax, and family allowances, he insisted that few 
other alternatives existed to address the issues faced by urban African Americans. In 
addition to his own misgivings toward such programs, Glazer acknowledged the 
“fantastically heavy expenditures” in Vietnam and opposition from Southern 
members of the US Congress as leaving little political possibility to amass support for 
significant federal investment in social programs aimed at ghettos.  Contending that 
President Johnson had not asked for new programs because he presumably didn’t 
think he could get them passed, Glazer maintained that the country would have to 
“ride out the riots and the danger of the breakdown of security and civilized life in the 
cities without great new social programmes.”220  
The thrust of Glazer’s various criticisms of potential social programs for 
ghettos coalesced around the notion that African Americans sought more than simply 
subsistence and jobs but rather “income with dignity.”221 Noting the difficulty to be 
found in defining “dignity,” he acknowledged the tragic circumstances in which any 
position an African American can or did achieve became “to some measure defiled 
with the notion that, as long as it is something he achieves in a white man’s society, it 
is in some measure un-dignified.”  In light of such circumstances, Glazer expressed 
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his understanding of the attraction Black Power held for African Americans and the 
insistence that “unskilled labour in service of their own (black) institutions” 
represented a more dignified endeavor than filling “the highest post in the white 
man’s society.”222  Still, Glazer made clear his uneasiness with the “confused cry” of 
Black Power, which meant “violence to the youth, looting to the drifters, revolution to 
theorists, and presumably to most of those who respond to it,…equality—in income, 
in jobs, [and] in respect.”223 Despite his paradoxical and heavily qualified 
endorsement of liberal social programs as the only viable means to address socio-
economic inequality in ghettos, Glazer revealed his increasingly neoconservative 
political orientation with his resignation on the virtual impossibility of addressing 
such issues since even “with the best will in the world, it becomes enormously 
difficult to equalize the goods of society in a situation in which the bases on which 
those goods get distributed are themselves maldistributed.”224   
Glazer’s disillusion with the potential role of government in addressing the 
prevalence of ghetto riots and the demands of Black Power marked the beginning of 
his journey on the well traveled path from youthful radicalism, to middle-aged 
liberalism and ultimately to neoconservatism undertaken by him and a number of his 
fellow New York Intellectuals. Expressing his belief that liberalism had been more 
effective in addressing the issues faced by earlier generations than at the time of his 
writing, Glazer maintained a nostalgic desire to return to the “open field of the New 
Deal.”225 Unlike the promising years of the New Deal, the liberal programs of the 
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1960s had “discouraged many men of good will, have raised Negro expectations and 
hope enormously, and have left us a heritage of new problems rather than new 
solutions.”226 Whereas Rovere had expressed smug satisfaction in 1963 with liberal 
achievements in the realm of Civil Rights despite the potential for the Movement to 
take a radical turn, the actual development of radicalism by 1967 led Glazer to a 
greater uneasiness with liberal programs and to a more conservative position. As the 
“vital center” liberalism espoused by the Congress came to appear incapable of 
accommodating Black Power or addressing ghetto riots, Glazer and his fellow New 
York Intellectuals, sans Dwight Macdonald, further shed the liberal pretenses they 
had begun to abandon in response to the New Left and identified, to varying degrees, 
with the emerging neoconservative movement.   
In concluding his assessment of what the future held for Black Power, ghetto 
riots, and American society, Glazer comprehensively criticized what he viewed as the 
only potential plans of action for the federal government but continued nonetheless to 
express an unshakable “faith” in the US to adapt to these challenges.227 Written as he 
was transitioning from a commitment to liberalism of the “vital center” to 
neoconservatism, the fundamentally paradoxical attitudes expressed towards liberal 
social programs by Glazer represented the difficulties he encountered in resolving his 
lingering, but increasingly disillusioned, attraction to liberalism as it had been 
understood in the early postwar years. Noting that not long ago white ethnics had 
passed through the ghettos described by many African Americans as “a jail” without 
considering them as such, Glazer contended that the issues faced by African 
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Americans were not qualitatively different from those faced, and largely overcome, 
by European immigrants.228  Having extensively criticized potential intervention from 
the federal government, Glazer’s continued “faith” in the US to address these issues 
implied that existing economic and social forces would be able meet the challenges 
faced by urban African Americans. Believing, perhaps, that the free market or some 
other non-governmental element of American society would prove effective in 
addressing the inequalities faced by African Americans, Glazer concluded with his 
faithful assertion that the US, “which has absorbed the immigrants and the working 
classes, will also be able to absorb the Negroes.”229  
Underneath this willfully optimistic view of the status quo of American 
society to address ghetto riots, Black Power, and other social developments, was the 
increasing tendency of Glazer, along with Bell, and Kristol to emphasize those 
aspects of the “end of ideology” that stressed social stability rather than those that 
encouraged social reform. Of the New York Intellectuals in the Congress that would 
come to find themselves labeled as neoconservatives, only Kristol self-identified with 
and embraced the label thrust upon them. Despite uneasiness with the 
neoconservative label, the bulk of the New York Intellectuals in the Congress came to 
the paradoxical position of stressing the necessity of vigorous and conservative 
politics to protect the liberal values they perceived as urgently threatened by the 
institutional challenges of the New Left and black militancy. That these prominent 
spokesmen of the liberal “vital center” felt the need to fundamentally abandon many 
of the values of this form of liberalism in order to protect those aspects of it they 
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perceived as gravely endangered demonstrates the gravity of the existential crisis 
faced by “vital center” liberalism in the 1960s.  
As they embraced an increasingly illiberal interpretation of liberalism first in 
response to the radicalism of the New Left and then in the wake of rising black 
militancy, Bell, Glazer, and Kristol brought to light the fundamentally different views 
on politics broadly, and foreign policy and the proper relationship of government and 
society specifically, held by members of the Congress. While the perceived urgency 
of the early postwar years and seemingly progressive nature of the “end of ideology” 
had allowed a group of Western intellectuals with strikingly diverse political views to 
coalesce under the label of “vital center” liberalism, the emergence of New Left and 
Civil Rights radicalism illuminated the divergences that had been kept under the 
surface. When “vital center” liberalism ceased to provide an appealing and broadly 
inclusive “middle ground” for Western intellectuals, the Congress lost the means to 
maintain a transatlantic intellectual consensus around this political philosophy as a 
necessary foundation for the continued prosperity of the Western cultural-intellectual 
tradition. While the exodus of Western intellectuals to the right and left of a liberal 
“vital center” in response to the New Left and radicalization of the Civil Rights 
Movement greatly weakened consensus around this political philosophy, “vital 
center” liberalism faced its greatest challenge from the escalation of US involvement 






The Vietnam War and the Demise of “Vital Center” 
Liberalism 
 
In the wake of seemingly anti-democratic US intervention in nations such as 
Guatemala and Iran, “The American Proposition,” or the idea that the US represented 
a necessary “bulwark of freedom” against threatening totalitarian forces, appeared 
increasingly questionable to many Western intellectuals. The massive scale and 
commitment required by the Vietnam War raised ever more difficult questions of the 
role of the US in the world. The new intellectual climate fostered by the Vietnam War 
was well understood by Michael Josselson, who consciously sought to conceal his 
growing disillusionment with America’s role as a necessary “bulwark of freedom” 
against totalitarian expansion. Privately he conceded that the shape “the American 
proposition” had assumed appalled him.230 Years later, Josselson wrote that “the 
experience of working with and for the ‘outfit’ [had become] truly traumatic…In the 
1950s our motivation was buttressed by America’s historic promises…in the second 
half of the 1960s our individual values and ideas [had] been eroded by our 
intervention in Vietnam and other senseless US policies.”231     
Commentary editor Norman Podhoretz echoed Josselson when he contended 
that the liberal and intellectual communities had lost the faith “they momentarily had 
at the height of the Cold War in the possibility that the United States, the main 
bulwark against Communism, could act as a relative force for the good in 
international affairs.”232  Inundated by the unprecedented coverage of the Vietnam 
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War, Western intellectuals absorbed the conflict’s scenes of terror and atrocity on a 
daily basis and noted the immense cost in blood and treasure consumed by the 
American intervention in Southeast Asia. As scenes of terror occurred with increasing 
frequency amid President Johnson’s infusion of some 500,000 ground troops into the 
conflict, Western intellectuals increasingly embraced the critical skepticism of the 
“American Proposition” noted by Podhoretz in Commentary but also found in The 
New York Review of Books, and New Statesman and Nation among other left-of-
center cultural-intellectual journals that competed with Congress publications. More 
than a decade removed from the death of Stalin and the particularly tense early years 
of the Cold War, the morally and strategically questionable designs of US foreign 
policy in Guatemala, Iran, and especially Vietnam, made clear to The New York 
Review of Books editor Jason Epstein and many others in the Western intelligentsia 
that “the evils of Stalinism did not guarantee a corresponding virtue in one’s own 
country.”233 Contending that the anti-Stalinism of intellectuals had been manipulated 
by forces such as the CCF to justify aggression in Vietnam, Epstein described the 
predicament of the Congress in the 1960s, claiming that “These people get into a real 
bind now. They’re caught with their pants down: they have to defend Vietnam 
because they’ve toed the anti-Communist line for so long that otherwise they stand to 
lose everything.”234 
While Epstein correctly identified the tremendous challenge presented to the 
Congress by massive US military intervention in Vietnam, the positions put forward 
by members of the Congress and articles printed in the organization’s journals make 
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clear that opposition to the Vietnam War, while strictly controlled and limited, was 
permitted, and in some cases, encouraged by Josselson and the Executive Committee 
of the Congress. As the Vietnam War escalated, Josselson endorsed the anti-war 
stances of John Kenneth Galbraith, Richard Löwenthal, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 
among other contributors to the CCF’s journals.235 Although opposition to US policy 
in Vietnam War received occasional support, and proved necessary for any hope of 
relevance among intellectuals during the later half of the 1960s, limits to the nature 
and shape of this opposition were held firmly in place. While Congress members and 
contributors to the CCF’s publications were free to oppose the specific problems and 
policies of Vietnam and the US decision to intervene in that country, a fundamental 
attack on the American prerogative to intervene militarily in distant lands remained 
off limits. Most importantly, the assertion put forward by many Western intellectuals 
that anti-communism of any form, including its liberal variety, inherently led to 
involvement in Vietnam was seen as an existential attack on the CCF and was not 
tolerated by the organization. While the specifics of the Vietnam War were opened to 
criticism in the latter half of the 1960s, an implication of “vital center” liberalism or 
the broader American political economy as responsible for the US military presence 
in Southeast Asia remained strictly off limits. 
Whereas the emergence of New Left radicalism and black militancy led to 
internal fragmentation in the Congress as leading members moved to the right or left 
of the liberal “vital center,” the escalation of the US war effort in Vietnam presented 
ultimately insurmountable challenges to the organization’s efforts to reach out to the 
broader Western intelligentsia. In contrast to the limited range of coverage on the 
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Vietnam War found in Encounter and other Congress publications, The New York 
Review of Books, New Statesman, and other competing left-of-center cultural-
intellectual journals specifically implicated the political philosophy of  “vital center” 
liberalism in the US war effort in Vietnam. As these competing journals gained 
greater influence among a Western intelligentsia increasingly critical of US policy in 
Vietnam by drawing those connections between “vital center” liberalism and the 
Vietnam War categorically missing from Congress publications, they furthered a 
disillusionment among Western intellectuals with the liberal “vital center” that had 
begun with the emergence of New Left radicalism and black militancy. With 
consensus among members of the Congress under a broad political umbrella of “vital 
center” virtually untenable, the extensive discrediting of the liberal “vital center” 
among the broader Western intelligentsia in the context of the Vietnam War 
decisively crippled what remained of the organization’s transatlantic intellectual 
consensus around this political philosophy as the foundation for the continued 
prosperity of the Western cultural-intellectual tradition.     
Playing no small part in the extensive discrediting of “vital center” liberalism, 
the emergence of new highly critical journals and the greater radicalism and militancy 
displayed by existing left-of-center cultural intellectual publications increasingly 
exposed the limitations of Encounter and other Congress publications as independent 
voices. Founded in 1963, Jason Epstein’s The New York Review of Books quickly 
found a receptive audience on both sides of the Atlantic, indicating that a significant 
number of Western intellectuals refused to act as Cold War legitimists within the 
framework of the American national security state. As consensus around  “vital 
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center” liberalism and the “American proposition” began to fragment, the Review 
signaled the emergence of a newly critical intelligentsia, with the desire and ability to 
discuss those issues virtually ignored by Encounter and other Congress journals. Not 
content to act as apologists for American power, the intellectuals writing for and 
drawn to the Review were as apt to denounce American economic and military 
imperialism as they were to denounce communism. The emergence of the Review as 
the flagship of intellectual opposition to the Vietnam War worried the CIA, which 
feared losing what influence it had been able to exert over the Western European 
intellectual community through Encounter.236 CIA IOD agent Lee Williams later 
remarked that the CIA had specifically hoped Encounter could respond to and 
mitigate the influence of the Review as the Agency “had a big problem with the yin 
and yang of the New York Review crowd, especially when it got so anti-Vietnam, and 
so left wing.”237 
Challenging the very foundation of the Congress, the escalation of the 
Vietnam War and large-scale commitment of ground troops by Lyndon B. Johnson in 
1965 signaled to many intellectuals the disastrous direction liberal anti-communism 
had taken. Noam Chomsky’s seminal 1967 article for The New York Review of Books, 
“The Responsibility of Intellectuals” forcefully criticized the intellectual climate in 
the US and argued that in its general subservience to power, American intellectuals 
bore a significant degree of responsibility for fostering the climate in which the 
policies that led to the Vietnam War fermented. Chomsky contended that the 
increasing turn of the US government towards a technocratic approach to the 
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problems of domestic society and the world in the mid-twentieth century resulted in a 
significant number of intellectuals serving in positions of influence and in close 
relationship with federal or state governments.238 The shift of many in the American 
intelligentsia from the traditional role of “free-floating” intellectuals as critical, 
independent and apart from society to positions of power in close association with 
government contributed to Chomsky’s understanding of the reasons why so many 
American intellectuals served as apologists for US foreign policy in Vietnam.239 
Though he refrained from identifying specific individuals, Chomsky’s description of 
this shift evokes the path of Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol, and other 
members of the Congress from youthful years as an intellectual vanguard to mature 
years as an intellectual institution.240  
In examining what he viewed as the servitude of US intellectuals to the 
political establishment, Chomsky highlighted the apologist consensus towards US 
foreign policy found among American intellectuals who had already achieved power 
and affluence as well as those intellectuals who believed they could achieve such 
prominence by “accepting society as it is” and promoting the existing “values that are 
being honored in this society.” 241 Noting how the values of American society during 
the postwar era found significant inspiration from the containment of communism, 
with a particular focus on checking the expansion of Chinese influence seen during 
the 1960s, Chomsky emphasized the role of scholar-experts who viewed their 
endorsement of US policy in Asia as part of a “responsible stance” intended to 
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construct a “value-free technology for the solution of technical problems that arise in 
contemporary society.”242   
Chomsky contended that in embracing their societally prominent positions 
and echoing the rhetoric of the political establishment, from which their social status 
stemmed, American intellectuals came to support State Department positions that 
justified the “application of American power in Asia, whatever the human cost, on the 
grounds that it is necessary to contain ‘the expansion of China.’”243 He added that in 
translating this from “State Department Newspeak,” the checking of Chinese 
expansion came to mean the necessity of reversing Asian nationalist revolutions or, at 
least, preventing them from spreading further.244 Chomsky cited, in particular, this 
mentality as explanation of “the frankness with which the United States Government 
and its academic apologists defended the American refusal to permit a political 
settlement in Vietnam,” which would have undoubtedly entailed some form of 
political involvement from the Vietcong in the form of its political arm, the National 
Liberation Front.245  
Though describing a generally ready acceptance of American intellectuals 
towards US policy in Vietnam, Chomsky viewed the reaction of the American 
intelligentsia to the Vietnam War as drawing a clear distinction between “responsible 
criticism” and “sentimental, emotional, or hysterical criticism.”246 The “hysterical 
critics,” Chomsky noted, were identified by this intellectual classification by “their 
irrational refusal to accept one fundamental political axiom, namely that the United 
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States has the right to extend its power and control without limit, insofar as is 
feasible.” He contrasted this classification with “responsible criticism” that refrained 
from challenging a broadly conceived US right to international geopolitical 
intervention but argued, rather, “that we probably can’t ‘get away with it’ at this 
particular place and time.”247 Chomsky’s recognition of this distinction between 
“responsible” and “hysterical” criticism of the Vietnam War reflected the very criteria 
upon which Josselson and the Congress permitted or suppressed criticism of the 
conflict. While articles questioning the ability of the US to “’get away with it’ at this 
particular place and time” could be found in Encounter and other Congress-sponsored 
journals, systematic critique of the US right to international geopolitical intervention, 
in Southeast Asia or elsewhere, remained absent from the organization’s 
mouthpieces.  
Refusing to adhere to the narrow confines of “responsible criticism” of the 
Vietnam War, many Western intellectuals began to further explore the contributions 
of the intelligentsia itself along with the ideology of liberal anti-communism to the 
massive engagement of the US military in Vietnam. In an extensive symposium on 
liberal anti-communism and the Vietnam War published in 1967, Commentary editor 
Norman Podhoretz and a host of prominent American and European writers assessed 
the role of the Congress and its apparent support of the philosophy that the ends 
justify the means in the wake of revelations detailing the CIA’s covert funding of the 
organization and the escalation of the Vietnam War. In his contribution to the 
symposium, Dissent editor Lewis Coser, described the “professional” anti-
communists of the Congress as making a “flourishing racket” out of anti-communism 
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and particularly singled out the ex-Communists of the organization for their 
“vociferous” opposition to communism and their adherence to the official party line 
of US foreign policy.248 For Coser, the Congress represented an “unedifying spectacle 
of American intellectuals waxing indignant about the kept intellectuals of the Soviet 
Union while being subsidized by secret or not so secret American government 
funds.”249 In his view, members of the Congress helped to “poison” the intellectual 
atmosphere of the late 1940s and 1950s by their abandonment of a critical stance 
towards their own society on the basis of anti-communism.250  
Partisian Review editor Philip Rhav confirmed Coser’s view of Congress 
members as eager to prioritize anti-communism over the importance of a critical 
stance and maintained that the very same ends justify the means logic, which allowed 
for covert funding of the organization, also provided the justification for intervention 
in Vietnam. Like many increasingly critical intellectuals of the 1960s, Rhav absorbed 
the daily atrocities of the Vietnam War and began to view anti-communism as 
inherently possessing a logic that stipulated that the means are irrelevant and only the 
Cold War ends should be considered.251 The critical views expressed by Coser and 
Rhav represented a significant change in position from the consensus shared by many 
Western intellectuals of the 1950s, which accepted the necessity to compromise 
certain ideals or editorial independence in the face of what was viewed as the direct 
threat of expanding communist influence.  
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In his contribution to the symposium, New Yorker writer Harold Rosenberg, 
contended that anti-communism of all varieties, whether reactionary, liberal, socialist 
or anarchist, contributed to the Vietnam War so long as the “axis of American foreign 
policy” was based on the geographic containment of communism. In Rosenberg’s 
view, the containment of communism led to a lesser-evil politics and a fixation on the 
notion that compared to communism anything could be construed as a lesser evil.252 
Echoing Rosenberg’s view on the implications of anti-communism, Coser also linked 
the development of liberal anti-communism to the eventual involvement of the US in 
the Vietnam War. He contended that the official anti-communist ideology of the US, 
originally intended primarily to justify interventions to safeguard Europe from 
communist influence, came to be applied obsessively on a world scale as the Cold 
War theatre moved into the Third World in the 1960s. For their role in bolstering 
official ideology, he placed significant responsibility on the intellectuals of the 
Congress for contributing to the policies and attitudes that made the Vietnam War 
possible. In his view, the American people would never have taken on the sacrifices 
of the Vietnam War had it not been for the ideological anti-communist propaganda 
forced on them for more than a decade before the war.253  
Like many intellectuals who came to question the value of the “American 
proposition” in the 1960s, Coser viewed official anti-communism as largely a 
justification for American involvement on behalf of the interests of American 
economic imperialism in the Third World. Concluding his assessment on liberal anti-
communism, Coser wrote that those committed to liberal or radical politics needed to 
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reject communist ideology and practice while simultaneously opposing the 
reactionary initiatives of American foreign policy, which he believed were regularly 
justified by official anti-communist ideology.254 As well as the New Left’s perception 
of the CCF as conservative and the rightward turn of a number of the organization’s 
leading members, the stress placed by Coser and other prominent Western on the 
increasingly reactionary nature of anti-communism further compounded perceptions 
of the Congress as a fundamentally conservative institution.  
Unlike the Podhoretz’s symposium, coverage of the Vietnam War in 
Encounter explicitly avoided discussion of American economic imperialism as a 
primary factor in US foreign policy in Southeast Asia and refrained from connecting 
“vital center” liberalism broadly, or liberal anti-communism specifically, to the US 
military presence in Vietnam. When articles on the Vietnam War filled significant 
portions of Commentary, New Statesman and Nation, and The New York Review of 
Book among other competing magazines in the mid-1960s, the number of articles 
devoted to the Vietnam War found in Encounter during the same period could be 
counted on one’s hands. The limited coverage of the Vietnam War found in 
Encounter centered around a series of articles that engaged in a dialogue on the role 
of Western policy in Vietnam between the British scholar of Southeast Asian history 
and languages, P.J. Honey, former co-editor Irving Kristol, and the journal’s most 
regular contributor on international politics, Richard Löwenthal.  
Written shortly after the large-scale introduction of American ground troops in 
1965 but before public opinion and positions within the Congress had turned 
decidedly against the War, Irving Kristol’s “Teaching In, Speaking Out: The 
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Controversy over Viet Nam” in the August 1965 issue of Encounter assessed the 
various forms in which dissent against US policy in Vietnam took shape.255 Kristol’s 
analysis of responses to the War identified three primary “institutions” of criticism: 
the immensely influential columnist, Walter Lippmann, the New York Times, and 
university faculty and students. Replicating the contours of classification later 
recognized by Noam Chomsky as representative of the response of American 
intellectuals to the War, he placed the criticism of Walter Lippmann and the New 
York Times into the category what Chomsky labeled “responsible criticism” and the 
dissident response of faculty and students into the “hysterical criticism” category.256  
Assessing Walter Lippmann’s “unique place in the history of American 
journalism because his authority derives from nothing else than his political 
intelligence, his political wisdom, his political independence,” Kristol quibbled with 
particular aspects of Lippmann’s opposition to US policy in Vietnam but broadly 
endorsed the opposition to US policy rooted in the political and military infeasibility 
of the mission he espoused. Contrasting the “responsible criticism” of Lippmann with 
the “hysterical criticism” of faculty and students, Kristol contended that Lippmann, 
unlike university protestors, “engages in no presumptuous suppositions as to ‘what 
the Vietnamese people really want’-he obviously doesn’t much care- or in legalistic 
exegesis as to whether, or to what extent, there is ‘aggression’ or ‘revolution’ in 
South Viet Nam.”257 Kistol placed Lippmann’s “realpolitik” opposition to US foreign 
into the same grouping as criticism found in the New York Times, principally in the 
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editorials of the newspaper’s leading political columnist, James Reston.258 By 
embracing the limited, and in some ways superficial, criticism of Lippmann and 
Reston, Kristol found the means to express his dissatisfaction with a War that was 
clearly not proceeding in a positive direction for the US but did so while confining his 
critique within limits that would allow his article to reach print in Encounter by 
avoiding a direct connection between “vital center” liberalism and US policy in 
Vietnam. While he had become increasingly uneasy with certain aspects of the liberal 
“vital center” as he responded to New Left radicalism and black militancy, the 
“responsible criticism” of avoiding an implication of “vital center” liberalism 
embraced by Kristol in this article demonstrates that in 1965 he still retained enough 
support for this political philosophy to remain in the Congress fold.  
The form of “responsible criticism” expressed by Lippmann and the New York 
Times echoed the type of critique on US policy in Vietnam typically featured in 
Encounter and stood in stark contrast with Kristol’s depiction of the positions held by 
university demonstrators whose particular form of dissent would not have been able 
to find its way into the pages of Encounter or other Congress journals. Kristol turned 
his attention on the protest at universities to the widespread emergence of teach-in 
demonstrations against the War. Described as “no less confused than the Viet Nam 
situation itself,” the teach-ins were assessed by Kristol as a minority group that 
nonetheless exerted considerable influence and proved instrumental in shaping the 
public perception of campuses.259 In trying to understand the motivations behind the 
youthful anti-war protest of students and young faculty, he described them as coming 
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from a “bored” generation who found themselves in the strange predicament of being 
radicals looking for a radical cause.260 Kristol further noted the superficial dissent of 
these young aimless radicals who were “sporting Castro-like beards, demanding the 
sale of contraceptives in the college book store…saying nice things about Mao Tse-
tung etc., etc….until Vietnam came into focus as a rally point.”261  
Questioning the political substance of university protestors who criticized US 
policy in Vietnam but offered precious few viable alternatives, he additionally 
criticized the easy, simplistic and naive pacifism and anti-imperialism that fueled the 
bulk of dissent on American campuses. Extending his efforts to discredit university 
protesters, Kristol emphasized that the majority of faculty involved in teach-ins were 
junior in rank and engaged in fields with “precious little to do with Vietnam.”262 He 
concluded his critical assessment of the psychologists, mathematicians and 
philosophers involved in teach-ins with the insistence that scholars of political 
science, international politics, Asian history or other fields related to Vietnam had far 
“too great of an appreciation of the complexity of the mess we are in to adopt a 
simplistic ‘anti’ position.”263 
In his efforts to discredit the dissent of students and faculty lacking official 
positions and expertise related to Vietnam, Kristol displayed his unshakable faith in 
the technocratic approach to issues of policy. Responding directly to Kristol’s article 
in “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” Chomsky posited, “even if we assume that 
they   [Washington experts] command the necessary knowledge and principles to 
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make the ‘best’ decision, will they invariably do so?”264 For Chomsky, the false 
assumption that the “purity” of American motives remained “a matter beyond 
discussion” provided the foundation for Kristol’s position and his classification of 
dissent into the categories of “responsible” and ‘hysterical” criticism265 Expressing a 
substantial skepticism towards exclusively technocratic decision making, Chomsky 
doubted that faculty and students became militant simply out of boredom, as argued 
by Kristol, but instead may have been seeking to find “the truth” for themselves 
rather than ceding this responsibility to technocrats.266  
In contrast to Kristol’s denigration of university protestors who lacked 
expertise beyond what “might be gleaned from a reading of the New York Times,” 
Chomsky insisted on any person of integrity judging the moral quality and goals of 
technocratic policy in Vietnam.267 Chomsky pointed to Kristol’s social science 
background and its influence on his refusal to engage in questions of morality as 
leading him to what Chomsky charged was an implicit disparagement of traditional 
intellectual values. For Chomsky, Kristol’s insistence that while anyone can concern 
themselves with moral and human rights issues, only experts can solve technical 
problems by “’sophisticated’ methods” betrayed a belief that only the latter type of 
problems are “important” or “real.268” Concluding his assessment of the article, 
Chomsky summarized Kristol’s classification of War criticism as resting on the 
notion that “responsible, non-ideological experts will give advice on tactical 
questions; irresponsible, ‘ideological types’ will ‘harangue’ about principle and 
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trouble themselves over moral issues and human rights, or over the traditional 
problems of man and society, concerning which ‘social and behavioral science’ has 
nothing to offer beyond trivialities.”269 By highlighting the “disparagement of 
traditional intellectual values” expressed in Kristol’s preference for technocrats over 
the average citizen probing the moral questions of Vietnam War and thinking for 
themselves, Chomsky demonstrated how the constrained approach to the Vietnam 
War necessitated by a consensus tethered to “vital center” liberalism and the 
technocratic “end of ideology” put the Congress at odds with the very intellectual 
values it was ostensibly formed to protect.270  
Following Kristol’s critical account of university dissenters, Encounter’s 
series on Western policy in Vietnam continued with Richard Löwenthal’s “America’s 
Asian Commitment” in the October 1965 issue of Encounter, which likewise sought 
to explain and categorize the divergence of positions on US policy in Vietnam.271 
Leaving the extremes of the left and right wings aside, Löwenthal divided reactions to 
the Vietnam War into three primary positions. On one side, he examined the school 
most effectively represented by Walter Lippmann, which demanded that the US limit 
its military commitments to areas of direct significance to its own security. He placed 
on the other side, the late John Foster Dulles and those who sought military alliance 
with anti-communist governments across the globe, regardless of whether or not these 
governments were viable or the people felt threatened by communism. Löwenthal 
threw his support behind the “vital center” liberalism of Presidents Truman and 
Kennedy, which accepted the worldwide nature of struggle against communist 
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powers but only provided military support to viable governments that requested it 
against a genuine communist threat. In his support for the “middle” position on 
Vietnam, Löwenthal expressed significant criticism of the specifics of US policy in 
Vietnam, with a particular focus on the untenable South Vietnamese government, but 
adhered to the precept found throughout Encounter’s coverage of the Vietnam War 
that the fundamental right of US intervention must remain unquestioned.  
While insisting on the necessity of US military intervention to check the 
expansion of communist powers and maintain the status quo of international 
geopolitical relations, Löwenthal considered Southeast Asia to be neither an area of 
crucial importance to US security nor of great significance in the world balance of 
power. Expressing opposition to the “domino theory” and noting the immense but 
nonetheless finite resources of the US military, he contended that the cost of the US’s 
enormous commitment in Vietnam could be seen in the diminished American concern 
with balancing Soviet strength in Europe.272 For Löwenthal, the increasing number of 
Western Europeans who echoed Charles de Gaulle’s doubts about American 
reliability in Europe provided vivid evidence of the tensions in the NATO alliance 
produced by US policy in South East Asia. Though opposed to a swift, complete and 
unilateral withdrawal on the basis of the harm it would wreak on US political and 
military prestige, he supported a suspension of the indiscriminate bombing of North 
Vietnam as part of a more sincere effort to facilitate negotiations with the North.273 
By negotiating a withdrawal based on a political settlement with the North, which 
would likely include some form of political participation from the National Liberation 
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Front in a coalition government in the South, Löwenthal believed the US could 
“allow the neutral Asian powers to play their natural role in balancing Chinese 
Communist influence, and thus to restore the world-wide freedom of action of the 
United States.” Though against the Vietnam War in the sense that he opposed the 
specific policies embraced by the Johnson administration and sought a greater effort 
on the part of the US to negotiate a withdrawal, Löwenthal ‘s opposition not only 
refrained from challenging the right of the US to engage in military intervention 
across the globe but remained firmly rooted in the notion that the greatest dangers of 
US policy in Vietnam were to be found in the detrimental effects they had on the 
ability of the US to project its military influence. 
Published in the following issue of Encounter as a counterpoint to Kristol’s 
“anti-war” article, P.J. Honey’s “Viet Nam Argument,” vividly manifested the CCF’s 
early anti-communist consensus and largely uncritical stance on the War. The article 
framed Honey’s authority on the Vietnam War, describing him as “one of the very 
small number of foreigners who speak Vietnamese and has lived for long periods in 
both North and South Viet Nam.”274 Focusing more on the political situation in South 
Vietnam than the military struggle against the North, Honey provided a particularly 
hard line of support for US intervention and most aspects of US policy in Vietnam. 
Striking an exceptionally questionable and unorthodox interpretation of international 
law, he contended that it was a misconception based on an inaccurate reading of 
international law and the propaganda of Communists that created the widespread 
belief that the 1954 Geneva Agreements bound South Vietnam to accept national 
elections in 1956. In Honey’s view, Ngho Dinh Diem represented the hopes of 
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virtually all non-communist Vietnamese for the possibility of establishing a liberal 
democracy and fully warranted the support given to him by the US. His admission 
that Diem failed to live up to these hopes and that the US failed to push the South 
Vietnamese to liberalize their system of government amounted to virtually the only 
criticism of US policy to be found in the article. In contrast to Löwenthal, who 
emphasized the endangerment of the US’s commitment to Europe, Honey concluded 
the article by insisting that the US must not withdraw from Vietnam and that a 
demonstration of American fortitude to “defend a friendly country which is resisting 
unprovoked armed attack (whether in Asia, Africa, or anywhere else) until the 
aggressors [have] been repulsed” would demonstrate to Europeans the “value of an 
American commitment.”275  
Concluding the dialogue on Western policy in Vietnam found in Encounter 
between 1965 and 1966, Löwenthal’s January, 1966 article, “The Vietnamese Agony: 
A Replay to Critics” evoked Ignazio Silone’s philosophy of a “differentiation of 
energies” as a strength of the Congress in its attempts to frame the series of articles as 
a free and open debate on the issues of the Vietnam War. Responding directly to 
Honey’s optimistic interpretation of Vietnamese politics and earlier challenges made 
by him, Löwenthal challenged his assertions that a Communist regime would be 
“repugnant to the overwhelming majority” of South Vietnamese and that the 
Vietcong lacked popular support in the South and secured cooperation only through 
the use or threat of force.276 Citing the ability of the Vietcong to assemble units and 
achieve success in surprise attacks despite months of heavy US bombing, he 
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contended that there could be no other explanation than legitimate popular support 
that would explain the guerilla force’s survival and offensive capabilities.277  
Löwenthal followed his questioning of opposing a guerilla force with 
legitimate popular support with a ringing endorsement of support for the containment 
of communism, whether politically, ideologically, economically or militarily, in 
support of a viable non-communist government. In his advocacy of communist 
containment as a potentially essential and worthy policy, he made the distinction that 
while US intervention in countries where Western security was not directly involved 
may not be a “vital Western concern” it nonetheless represented a “legitimate 
Western concern.”278 It was in distinguishing between “vital” and “legitimate” 
concerns that Löwenthal articulated his opposition to the specifics of the Vietnam 
policy while still supporting the notion of US military intervention to thwart 
communist expansion in principle. He contended that where Western security is not 
directly involved, and the foundation of the contest rests not on control of territory 
but on the allegiance of a people, the support of a “cohesive political force” was 
necessary for US intervention to make sense. 279 Thus his opposition to US policy in 
Vietnam rested not on resistance to the fundamental mission of what the US was 
trying to achieve but rather on the view that the US was engaged in a politically, and 
likely militarily, unwinnable contest. Exemplifying Chomsky’s designation of 
“responsible criticism” as resting on the notion that the “purity” of American motives 
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remain “a matter beyond discussion,” Löwenthal’s criticism explicitly embraced the 
intention of the US mission in Vietnam but cast serious doubts as to its feasibility.280  
The presence of criticism towards US policy in Vietnam found in Encounter, 
however limited, represented a shift that occurred with the replacement of Irving 
Kristol with Melvin Lasky as co-editor in 1958. During the years of Kristol’s co-
editorship of Encounter, his preoccupation with the pervasiveness of European anti-
Americanism as a sort of psychological disease imbued the tone and content of 
virtually all of the political articles found in the journal 281 While Lasky avoided the 
categorical rejection of anti-Americanism undertaken by Kristol, he still ensured that 
both simplistic and superficial as well as more nuanced and substantially structural 
positions of anti-Americanism featured infrequently in the pages of Encounter. 
However, unlike Kristol, he made sure to avoid exercising too heavy of hand as he 
recognized that “in the matter of American materials, that the USA be constantly 
projected ‘positively’, that all the European anti-American stereotypes be made short 
shrift of” would leave the journal open that charges that it was a “Trojan horse for 
American interests.”282 
Questioning the degree to which Lasky succeeded in obscuring a pro-
American bias in Encounter, Irish writer, Conor Cruise O’Brien, utilized his review 
of an anthology compiling the first decade of material from Encounter for New 
Statesman to write a polemic against the very basis of the journal.283 O’Brien’s article 
began with a forceful charge against the editors’ assertion articulated in the first issue 
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that “Encounter seeks to promote no ‘line.’”284 He likewise challenged the additional 
assertion in the first issue that the Congress was brought together by “two things: a 
love of liberty and a respect for that part of human endeavor that goes by the name of 
culture.” O’Brien argued that to “promote no ‘line’” in reality meant to convey the 
impression that the anti-communist and pro-capitalist propaganda found in the journal 
was not actually propaganda but rather the “spontaneous and almost uniform reaction 
of the culturally free, of truly civilized people.”285 He portrayed Encounter as largely 
successful in conveying this deceitful impression and contended that the CCF’s 
“love” for liberty and “respect” for culture more often than not manifested themselves 
in the journal as “cleverly written material favorable to the United States and hostile 
to the Soviet Union.”286 
Supporting his case for the undeniably pro-American position of Encounter, 
O’Brien highlighted the frequency with which truths that would be “uncomfortable” 
for the US were either ignored entirely or mitigated in significance. Citing the CCF’s 
supposed love of liberty, he rhetorically asked where Encounter’s dedication to 
liberty was when the Cuban people’s suffering under Batista warranted no coverage. 
Examination of Encounters coverage, or lack of coverage, on Nicaragua, Guatemala, 
and South Korea led O’Brien to claim that the journal generally remained silent in 
those cases where the oppressors were identified with the interests of the US and 
outraged when the oppressors adhered to communist politics of any shade. In his final 
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judgment of the journal’s political positions, he boldly concluded that “Encounter’s 
first loyalty is to America.”287 
O’Brien’s polemical article on the Congress in 1964 marked an intensification 
of the rivalry between The New Statesman and Encounter. Intended by the CIA from 
its establishment in 1953 “to engage in a permanent polemic with The New Statesman 
and Nation,” Encounter’s competition with the neutralist weekly for the support of 
Western intellectuals grew in intensity as the Vietnam War escalated.288 As this 
rivalry mounted, New Statesman reached out to a Western intelligentsia rapidly losing 
patience with US policy in Vietnam by presenting a wide range of positions that 
accentuated the comparatively circumscribed “differentiation of energies” expressed 
in the series of articles on the War in Encounter. As it came to accommodate 
positions that fell into Chomsky’s designation of “hysterical criticism” and readily 
drew connections between “vital center” liberalism and the escalation of the US 
military intervention in Vietnam, New Statesman achieved its greatest commercial 
success with a British circulation reaching almost 90,000 while the circulation of 
Encounter hovered around 35,000 during the same period.289  
Writing on a massive anti-war demonstration in New York in the April 21st, 
1967 issue of New Statesman, American journalist and regular contributor, Andrew 
Kopkind, drew connections between “vital center” liberalism and the Vietnam War in 
a manner characteristic of the journal’s coverage of the War during the period.290  
Kopkind began “The Great Vietnam March” with a rejection the New York Time’s 
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pronouncement that the “Spring Mobilisation” in New York would have no “moral 
impact or political effect” and contended instead that the demonstration represented a 
significant turning point marking a “consolidation of all the diffuse and disparate 
dissent of the last two years” into “a new and bitter mood of resistance.”291 
Contending that it was now possible to speak of an anti-war movement, he noted the 
incorporation of African American civil rights leaders into a protest that had 
previously been represented by middle class white Americans and framed Martin 
Luther King’s embrace of the anti-war movement as “a major political event of the 
year.”292  
 In describing the “inevitable” combination of the anti-war movement and the 
Civil Rights Movement, Kopkind linked “vital center” liberalism to US intervention 
in Vietnam with the contention that the very same issues that were at stake in US 
foreign policy also operated in the domestic sphere. With the assertion that “even the 
sketchiest analysis of ‘liberal imperialism’ pointed to parallels between the liberalism 
deployed abroad and “the forces which keep Negroes in an inferior political economic 
and social status,” he strongly refuted those who viewed the development of King and 
other Civil Rights leaders getting “hung up on the war” as detrimental to the Civil 
Rights Movement.293 Embracing a broader notion of Civil Rights steeped in the 
notion of human rights, he contended that in the matters of the Civil Rights 
Movement and the anti-war movement, “nothing can be done about one without 
doing it about the other.”294 In drawing a clear connection between the Civil Rights 
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Movement and the anti-war movement, Kopkind implicitly advanced a 
comprehensive critique of “vital center liberalism” that would not have made its way 
into the pages of Encounter or other Congress journals. As the escalation of the 
Vietnam War made such critiques of “vital center” liberalism more persuasive to 
intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic, the conspicuous absence of these issues in 
Encounter became increasingly apparent and illustrated the emerging gulf between 
the circumscribed positions of the journal and a Western intelligentsia rapidly losing 
patience with “vital center” liberalism. 
 Providing another critique of “vital center” liberalism characteristic of New 
Statesman, Kopkind examined the issue of “liberal imperialism” in his September 
22nd, 1967, article “The Vietcong in Europe.”295 In the article, Kopkind detailed a 
meeting in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia among National Liberation Front leaders, high 
ranking officials from North Vietnam, a contingent of American anti-war activists 
comprised of Quaker pacifists, Black Power activists, radical New Left intellectuals, 
and a “hippy or two” among others.296 While devoting the better part of the article to 
deliberations between the NLF, North Vietnamese and American delegates 
concerning the relative strength of NLF’s military and political position in the South, 
his assessment of the increasingly radical nature of the anti-war movement in the US 
further developed the structural critique of US policy in Vietnam and “vital center” 
liberalism expressed in his earlier article.  He noted the enthusiasm displayed by the 
American delegates in response to the “surprisingly moderate” political program 
presented by the NLF as a manifestation of the changes that had occurred in the anti-
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war movement in the past few months as more protestors “developed a deeper 
sympathy for revolution.”297  
For Kopkind, this newfound sympathy for revolution resulted from American 
protestors coming to terms with the reality that “the war is only a symptom of 
imperialism, and its is the whole political economy, not just President Johnson or the 
Pentagon, that is the object of attack.”298 By seriously listening to the American 
delegates, and their view of the War as a direct consequence of liberal imperialism, 
Kopkind ventured into the territory of “irresponsible criticism” categorically 
eschewed in Encounter. Unencumbered by the limitations faced by contributors to 
Encounter, Kopkind found in the New Statesman the means to freely and seriously 
examine the motivations and ideas of anti-war activists and intellectuals increasingly 
critical of the US mission in Vietnam. By taking these newly critical intellectual 
currents seriously and rejecting the axiom that the “purity” of American motivations 
remain a “matter beyond discussion,” Kopkind advanced a critique connecting “vital 
center” liberalism that allowed him to engage a critical intellectual audience wholly 
dismissed by Encounter and other Congress journals.299  
 As the comprehensive critiques connecting  “vital center” liberalism to US 
policy in Vietnam found in competing cultural-intellectual journals resonated with a 
greater number of Western intellectuals in the wake of large-scale US military 
intervention in Southeast Asia, the absence of such discussion in the journals 
published by the Congress became increasingly conspicuous. In the political and 
intellectual landscape of the 1950s, Encounter and the Congress could plausibly insist 
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that the Congress had been brought together by only “two things: a love of liberty and 
a respect for that part of human endeavor that goes by the name of culture.”300 
However, by the mid-1960s the inability of the Congress to critique “vital center” 
liberalism in the context of the Vietnam War demonstrated to many Western 
intellectuals that the foundation of the organization did not rest on liberty and culture 
alone. While the emergence of the New Left radicalism and black militancy led to 
fissures in the CCF’s consensus around “vital center” liberalism, the inability of the 
organization to question this political philosophy and still maintain consensus among 
its members presented ultimately insurmountable challenges to its efforts to engage 
the broader Western intelligentsia during the era of the Vietnam War. When “vital 
center” liberalism came to be more of a point of contention than source of cohesion 
within the organization and extensively thwarted its outreach efforts, a transatlantic 
intellectual consensus around this political philosophy as the foundation for the 




                                                




By responding to the existing cultural, intellectual, and political needs of the 
Western intelligentsia in the tense early years of the Cold War, the Congress 
successfully fostered a transatlantic intellectual consensus in its first decade of 
existence around “vital center” liberalism as a necessary foundation for the continued 
prosperity of the Western cultural-intellectual tradition. With the Communists seizing 
power in Czechoslovakia while the Community Party and its intellectual 
sympathizers wielded significant influence in Western Europe, NCL intellectuals on 
both sides of the Atlantic viewed the Western cultural-intellectual tradition as gravely 
threatened by the increasing attraction or sympathy of intellectuals to communism. 
The Congress found success in strengthening ties between these NCL intellectuals by 
engaging this often-divisive group with a broadly inclusive political umbrella of 
“vital center” liberalism and stressing the dangers faced by the cultural-intellectual 
tradition shared by the US and Europe. In the urgent context of the 1950s, a 
transatlantic intellectual consensus around “vital center” liberalism allowed the 
Congress to bring together a significant cohort of European intellectuals, who both 
opposed Soviet communism and accepted a greater role of the US in European 
political, cultural and intellectual affairs.301 
 The Congress established and developed this transatlantic consensus during its 
early years by pushing Arthur Koestler and other excessively militant anti-
communists to the margins of the organization. As it settled on and further defined 
the contours of consensus around “vital center” liberalism shortly after its successful 
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1950 inaugural conference in Berlin, the Congress blossomed into an extensive 
organization of international stature and enjoyed its most successful years. In the 
1950s, an urgent sense of communist threat and the promise of the US as an attractive 
“bulwark of freedom,” allowed European democratic socialists such as Bertrand 
Russell and Ignazio Silone, traditional postwar consensus liberals such as Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr., budding anarchists such as Dwight Macdonald, and nascent 
neoconservatives such as Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, and Irving Kristol to lay claim 
to the label of “vital center” liberalism. With the emergence of New Left radicalism 
and black militancy fracturing this transatlantic intellectual consensus within the 
organization and the inability of the Congress to freely criticize the Vietnam War 
thwarting its efforts to engage the broader Western intelligentsia, “vital center” 
liberalism ceased to provide a broad base for consensus and became instead a major 
source of contention. In the wake of such developments in the 1960s, Western 
intellectuals no longer showed the same predisposition to gloss over inconvenient 
political divergences by engaging in expedient misunderstandings of one another’s 
interpretations of liberalism. When the strikingly different views of the proper 
relationship of government to society and the appropriate role of the US in the world 
held by members came to light in the 1960s, the “middle ground” of “vital center” 
liberalism ceased to hold together the often-divisive collection of intellectuals in the 
Congress.302   
Though the Congress met its official demise in 1967 with the decision to 
change its name to the International Association for Cultural Freedom after a scathing 
1967 article in Ramparts detailing its CIA funding, the deterioration of the 
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organization’s transatlantic intellectual consensus during the course of the 1960s 
ended its existence as a meaningful organization irrespective of issues of CIA 
funding. Though the Congress neither needed to nor sought to express a monolithic 
political position, the “vital center” had provided the organization with cohesion 
around a broad political consensus in opposition to communism and in support of a 
mixed economy and welfare state. Whether challenged by a rightward turn to 
neoconservatism, a leftward drift to anarchism or generally discredited in the 
escalation of the Vietnam War, the deterioration of the liberal “vital center”, both 
within the Congress, and the broader Western intelligentsia, brought an end to the 
period in which the organization could maintain a transatlantic intellectual consensus 
around this political philosophy as a necessary and attractive guardian of the Western 
cultural-intellectual tradition. When “vital center” liberalism no longer provided an 
effective point around which to rally Western intellectuals in opposition to 
communism and in defense of the Western cultural-intellectual tradition, the 
Congress ceased to be either a valuable potential ally for the CIA or a viable 
independent cultural-intellectual organization.  
As it struggled to function as a cohesive organization on a foundation that 
provided more points of contention than bases for consensus, the Congress suffered 
its official demise in the wake a series of revelations detailing the nature of its covert 
funding. The first of these revelations came on April 27th, 1966 when The New York 
Times ran the third article in a series on the wide range of CIA operations, which 
specifically detailed CIA funding of the CCF and Encounter.303 The Congress laid 
                                                
     303 “CIA is Spying 100 Miles Up; Satellites Probe Secrets of the Soviet Union,” New York Times, 
April 27, 1966. 
 127 
 
low, neither attempting a libel suit against the Times nor acknowledging the 
accusations, until the San Francisco based New Left magazine, Ramparts, re-opened 
and brought significant attention to the issue of CIA funding ten months later. Sol 
Stern’s article in the March 1967 issue of Ramparts, reported at length on CIA 
funding and use of both the Congress and the National Student Association in the 
anti-communist struggle.304 In contrast to the brief and seemingly objective reporting 
of the Times article, Stern’s more antagonistic exposé of CIA meddling into cultural 
and student affairs brought to bear the intense hostility of the New Left towards the 
Congress and reflected an intellectual climate that had become increasingly critical of 
American institutions.305  
In the wake of the scathing exposé on CIA funding in Ramparts, the critical 
and wide-ranging views held by members of the Congress and interested observers in 
the broader Western intelligentsia came to light. Though many members of the 
Congress continued to stress their belief in the importance of the CCF’s mission 
despite the inherent contradiction of promoting cultural freedom while secretly 
receiving state funding, the negative reactions to news of CIA funding expressed by a 
significant collection of leading members exposed the prevalence with which the 
organization’s raison d’être had come to be questioned internally. In response to 
those members of the Congress who defended its mission and record, founding 
member William Phillips portrayed the personalities of the organization as “breezy, 
rootless, free-wheeling, cynically anti-Communist orgmen.”306 Demonstrating an 
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escalation of his earlier disillusionment with the Congress, Dwight Macdonald 
responded to the CCF’s defenders by connecting the efforts of the Congress to the 
“President’s genocidal crusade” in Vietnam and expressed his belief that there 
remained no moral imperative that the organization should continue to exist.307  
While Macdonald, Phillips, and others challenged the value and mission of the 
Congress from the left, news of the organization’s CIA funding led other leading 
figures to mount challenges from the right. Echoing views that would resonate with 
Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, and Irving Kristol as they embraced increasingly 
neoconservative positions, James Burnham, one of the CCF’s principal founders, 
expressed his disillusionment with liberalism of the “vital center” as an effective anti-
communist force in the March 21st 1967 issue of National Review. The Congress had 
been founded in 1950 with the belief that the “vital center” liberalism of NCL 
intellectuals provided the most effective form of anti-communism for reaching out to 
Europe’s left-of-center intelligentsia. For Burnham, the CIA had erred in their 
estimation that the NCL represented a reliably anti-communist force that would be, if 
not pro-Western and pro-American, at least not anti-Western and anti-American. 
Burnham looked to NCL responses on Cuba, the Dominican Republic and especially 
Vietnam in contending that the NCL intellectuals of both Europe and the US had 
adopted increasingly anti-American positions and could not be relied upon politically. 
In examining the organizational collapse of the Congress, Burnham saw the political 
unreliability of NCL intellectuals grouped around the “vital center” as the primary 
culprit. Demonstrating the distance that had emerged between him and the 
transatlantic consensus of the Congress, Burnham not only repudiated the doctrine 
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fastened on the CIA by Allen Dulles that the global struggle against communism 
must be based on the NCL but additionally contended that the CCF’s “NCL 
prescription” had hampered the nation’s anti-communist will and jeopardized its 
security.308  
As the 1960s progressed, increasing skepticism towards “vital center” 
liberalism as the primary foundation of the CIA’s anti-communist operations could 
also be found in the International Operations Divisions (IOD), which provided the 
Congress with the bulk of its funding. Former CIA IOD Director, Thomas Braden, 
voiced support for Burnham’s critical view of “vital center” liberalism as a reliable 
anti-communist force when he wrote a revealing and vigorous defense of CIA 
funding of the Congress in the May 21, 1967 issue of the Saturday Evening Post. The 
article, “I’m Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral,” stressed the value of CIA covert funding of 
anti-communist organizations such as the Congress in opposing the extensive array of 
front operations conducted by the Soviet Union. Defending the necessity of covert 
CIA funding, Braden contended that “Back in the early 1950s, when the cold war was 
really hot, the idea that [the US] Congress would have approved many of our projects 
was about as likely as the John Birch Society’s approving Medicare.”309 Striking 
direct attacks on any future possibility of credibility for the Congress or its 
publications, he detailed the placement of a CIA agent (Josselson) into the leadership 
of the CCF and another (Lasky) as an editor of Encounter. In addition to directly 
implicating guilty parties, Braden’s article provided insight into how the CIA sought 
to conduct its front operations and wrote that a major guideline was to “use existing 
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organizations; disguise the extent of American interest; protect the integrity of the 
organization by not requiring it to support every aspect of official American 
policy.”310 The limits and toleration displayed in discourse on the Vietnam War in 
Encounter provide a compelling example of this commitment to “protect the integrity 
of the organization.”311 
 Despite leaving the CIA in 1954, Braden’s volunteering of previously 
confidential information would have been in violation of his secrecy agreements with 
the Agency had he not had its support.312 As such, his inflammatory revelations, 
intended to damage the Congress, must be seen as carrying the seal of CIA approval. 
In eliminating whatever remaining credibility the Congress possessed in 1967 and 
severely limiting its prospects for the future, Braden’s article marked the end of the 
CIA’s fifteen-year embrace of “vital center” liberalism and the non-communist left as 
the primary platform of its anti-communist operations. While CIA documents 
illuminating the perspective and motivations of the Agency remain unavailable, 
former IOD agent John Hunt later speculated on the meaning of Braden’s article. 
Describing Braden as an “instrument” of those in the CIA who wanted to get rid of 
the non-communist left, Hunt regarded the article as “an operational decision to blow 
the Congress and other programs out of the water.”313  
Unable to recover from Braden’s revelatory article, Michael Josselson 
prepared his resignation and called for the CCF General Assembly to meet on May 
13, 1967 to determine the future of the organization. Beyond coming to an agreement 
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that the Congress should continue to exist in some form, little consensus concerning 
the future emerged from the meeting. In the months following Josselson’s 
resignation, the Congress rebranded itself as the International Association for Cultural 
Freedom (IACF) and appointed the Ford Foundation President, Shepard Stone, as the 
organization’s new executive secretary.314 Receiving funding from only legitimately 
private sources, the IACF inherited the CCF’s remaining family of magazines, 
national committees as well as its commitment to international seminars and the ideal 
of a transnational community of intellectuals but would never again find the sense of 
purpose or resonance with the intellectual community wielded by the organization in 
the 1950s. Issues of CIA funding aside, the IACF continued on the path to ruin first 
embarked on when the CCF’s transatlantic intellectual consensus around “vital 
center” liberalism as a necessary foundation for the Western cultural-intellectual 
tradition disintegrated during the course of the 1960s. Lacking an alternative to the 
successful transatlantic intellectual consensus fostered by the Congress in the 1950s, 
the IACF struggled on in a largely irrelevant role for another decade. Few noticed 
when the Paris headquarters closed its doors in 1977 and the IACF voted to dissolve 
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